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INTRODUCTION 
ecurities law has long existed at the intersections of private and 
public law, and also state and federal law. Currently, securities 
law, like the capital markets, is becoming international. This Article will 
address how international securities regulation relies upon soft law, but 
frequently becomes hard law. 
Soft law is nonbinding standards and principles of conduct. It may 
emanate from international organizations such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), where state mem-
bers agree to resolutions or recommendations. Or it may be the result of 
international organizations such as the International Organization of Se-
curities Commissions (“IOSCO”), where individual regulators espouse 
principles and best practices. A large part of the soft law of securities 
regulation is standard setting by self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) 
such as the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”), which 
formulates accounting principles for use by companies. 
Hard law, on the other hand, is statutes, regulations, and treaties and is 
binding. Soft law sometimes can harden law when it is incorporated into 
statutes, regulations, and even treaties. For example, after establishing 
norms through soft law, the OECD concluded a treaty combating bribery 
that States adopted and ratified. Congress may implement standards set 
by private bodies in a statute. Frequently, statutes in the securities field 
are passed in response to financial crises and, to some extent, incorporate 
pre-existing soft law into statutory language. Soft law may be codified 
through regulation. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (“SEC”) has adopted rules codifying best practices established by 
IOSCO. Alternatively, self-regulatory law can become subject to gov-
ernment oversight and consequently become binding. 
In the United States, securities regulation is primarily found in the fed-
eral securities laws enacted from 1933 to 1940 and their subsequent 
amendments, as well as in the implementing regulations of the SEC. 
Some securities regulation also comes from state corporate and securities 
laws. Much of federal securities regulation is based upon SRO standards, 
and today, securities industry SROs are subject to extensive SEC over-
sight. In other countries, a similar trajectory—from SRO standard setting 
to regulation by government securities commissions—has been followed. 
In the European Union, although there are numerous securities regulation 
directives, there is not an EU securities commission. Nevertheless, the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”) coordinates 
regulation by the various EU Member States, each of which has a securi-
ties regulatory commission. 
S 
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Numerous international bodies are involved in the development of se-
curities standards. IOSCO, for instance, is an international body com-
posed of securities regulators from all over the world, which formulates 
standards for securities regulation. Its members pledge to implement 
these standards in their home countries to the extent they are able to do 
so, but IOSCO standards do not have the force of either international or 
national law. Other bodies that work on establishing regulatory standards 
in the securities field include the OECD, the World Bank and similar 
regional banks, and the World Federation of Stock Exchanges. But any 
standard setting by such bodies is soft law, although it may influence 
national legislatures or even lead to treaties. 
One issue that this Article will address is why so much standard setting 
in the field of securities regulation is accomplished through soft law. We 
believe this occurs because of the need for speed, flexibility, and exper-
tise in dealing with fast-breaking developments in capital markets. Since 
SRO standards and other soft law are based on a consensus by partici-
pants in the markets, soft law is frequently more informed and more ef-
fective than statutory law, although it may eventually be translated into 
statutes or rules for enforcement purposes. The soft law of securities reg-
ulation also can become hard law when it is recognized as custom and 
usage in the securities industry; this is the content of many SRO stan-
dards. National legislatures are often leery of interfering with financial 
markets and may be even more divided than players in those markets as 
to how to address problems that threaten the markets or investors. Inter-
national regulatory bodies find it even more difficult to agree on appro-
priate regulation for the securities markets, in part because national mar-
ket centers and firms compete with one another. Treaties take much too 
long to become law to rectify most problems that arise in capital markets. 
Despite the advantages of soft securities regulatory law, its use has 
some drawbacks. Not all concerned parties necessarily have input into its 
formulation. To some extent, this deficit can be addressed through ap-
propriate consultative processes by standard-setting organizations. In 
terms of U.S. constitutional law, the widespread use of soft law in the 
regulation of global capital markets seems to contradict the treaty-
making powers of Congress and the President. Indeed, the SEC, an inde-
pendent regulatory agency, negotiates and utilizes memoranda of under-
standing (“MOUs”), which are treaty-like agreements, but are soft law. 
Even though MOUs and other forms of soft law may survive constitu-
tional scrutiny, they still raise some serious questions concerning checks 
and balances, accountability, and transparency. 
The plethora of regulators and organizations engaged in the production 
of both hard and soft law in the securities field can lead to a race to the 
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bottom in standard setting, and to the under-enforcement of the estab-
lished regulations. While some academics argue that regulatory competi-
tion is salutary, the authors are skeptical that such competition in the  
international realm produces sufficiently robust legal standards. Until 
relatively recently, the U.S. economy and capital markets were so much 
stronger than any other national economy that the SEC could impose  
rigorous standards upon the issuers and investment bankers of other na-
tions. In a world where there is no economic hegemony by any one coun-
try, it is necessary for all of the major players in the global capital mar-
kets to agree upon the regulation of these markets. The development of 
standards through soft law is probably the only realistic method of doing 
so. 
Part I of this Article will discuss the use of soft law in securities regu-
lation, and why soft law works in this field. It will also introduce some 
international soft-law generators. Part II will set forth four examples of 
the use and hardening of soft law in the international realm, specifically, 
the establishment of international financial reporting standards (“IFRS”) 
by the IASB; the development of MOUs by securities regulators; the ne-
gotiation of an anti-bribery treaty in the OECD; and the development of 
standards regulating credit rating agencies (“CRAs”). Part III will discuss 
some of the costs and benefits of the widespread use of soft law to regu-
late capital markets. 
I. THE USE OF SOFT LAW FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 
A. A Short History of Soft Law in Securities Regulation 
Before there were any state or federal securities laws, securities regula-
tion was a matter of contract between stock exchanges and other SROs 
and their members and listed companies. The New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) was organized in 1792 by brokers to govern securities trading 
in the wake of a scandal in the government bond market after the Revo-
lutionary War.1 In addition to establishing fixed commission rates2 and 
                                                                                                                       
 1. See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 383–84 (2004). 
 2. The fixing of commission rates was the keystone of SRO regulation, not only for 
the NYSE, but later for the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (“NASD”), 
which was formed in 1936, in a restructuring of a trade group previously known as the 
Investment Bankers Association of America. See Donna Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with 
Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
975, 1023–24 (2005). Members of the NASD, and later, the Nasdaq Stock Market (“Nas-
daq”) did not trade on an agency basis and charge commissions, but did trade as dealers 
with members at preferential prices. See Roger D. Blanc, Intermarket Competition and 
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setting standards of conduct for the trading of securities, the NYSE also 
regulated the corporate governance of large public corporations by con-
tractual agreements so that the exchange could advertise that its listed 
issuers were “blue chip” companies. Prior to the twentieth century, such 
listing agreements were individually negotiated with companies and were 
flexible and subject to ad hoc enforcement.3 
As early as 1869, the Stock List Committee of the NYSE evaluated the 
qualitative character of listed companies regarding business, manage-
ment, capitalization structure, financials, and accounting policies to de-
termine whether a company should be listed.4 It was not until the early 
twentieth century that listing criteria became more standardized and in-
cluded such investor protections as requirements that listed companies 
have an annual shareholders’ meeting and distribute financial informa-
tion to shareholders.5 
After the 1929 stock market crash the first federal securities laws were 
passed. The Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”)6 covers initial dis-
tributions of securities and requires that securities issuances be registered 
with the SEC prior to sale unless an appropriate exemption from registra-
tion was available.7 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange 
Act”)8 covers postdistribution trading of securities and gives the SEC 
oversight of stock exchanges and trading markets, including listed com-
panies, as well as securities industry intermediaries. Many matters pre-
viously dealt with in NYSE listing agreements, such as quarterly and 
annual financial reporting, the holding of annual meetings, and the need 
for independent audits, became matters of federal law.9 Nevertheless, 
stock exchanges continued to formulate and enforce listing standards, 
and in 1996 Congress pre-empted blue sky securities laws.10 Then, in 
                                                                                                                       
Monopoly Power in the U.S. Stock Markets, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. & COM. L. 273, 278 
(2007). See also United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975). 
 3. Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Stan-
dards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1465–66 (1992). 
 4. See CHARLES A. DICE & WILFRED J. EITEMAN, THE STOCK MARKET 111–16 (2d ed. 
1941). 
 5. See Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Gover-
nance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1498–99 (2002) [hereinafter Special Study on Listing Stan-
dards]. At about this same time, the states began to pass securities regulation statutes 
designed to assure that public offerings of securities were based on fair, just, and equita-
ble capital structures. Id. See also Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917). 
 6. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1933). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 77e. 
 8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1934). 
 9. Special Study on Listing Standards, supra note 5, at 1500. 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1996). See also Pinnacle Commc’ns Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Family 
Mortgage Corp., 417 F. Supp.2d 1073 (D. Minn. 2006). 
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response to the Enron and WorldCom debacles and the bursting of the 
stock market technology bubble, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200211 au-
thorized the SEC to oversee SROs.12 
SRO ratemaking had a somewhat different history. The fixed minimum 
commission rate for NYSE and other stock exchange trades was under-
mined by market practices and the growth of institutional investors in the 
1970s. The NYSE, however, resisted the unfixing of commission rates, 
while the Supreme Court held that antitrust laws did not apply to the sys-
tem of fixed commission rates because direct and active SEC supervision 
negated antitrust liability.13 Then, both Congress and the SEC provided 
that fixed commission rates be abolished.14 Under a threat similar to 
Congressional legislation, the SROs also moved from the one-eighth se-
curities trading convention to decimal pricing.15 
Both the NYSE and NASD engaged in regulation of their members 
with respect to the protection of customers, and disciplined members for 
unfair or improper conduct. Prior to 1975, any SEC oversight of SRO 
rulemaking and disciplinary activities was loose and informal. In the Se-
curities Act Amendments of 1975, the SEC was given the power to in-
itiate, as well as to approve, SRO rulemaking, and the SEC’s role in SRO 
enforcement and discipline was expanded.16 The Exchange Act now pro-
vides that new SRO rules and rule changes must be filed with the SEC 
and approved by the SEC before they can become effective.17 
At one time, SROs denied their members certain fundamental rights. 
For example, persons under investigation were not entitled to bring 
                                                                                                                       
 11. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 12. This included changing SRO listing rules to meet certain corporate governance 
standards as to board and committee structures. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 
(2002). 
 13. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975). 
 14. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975); Ex-
change Act, § 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e) (1934). Exchange Act Rule 19b-3 prohibited fixed 
commissions, but was rescinded in 1988. Rescission of Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 
26,180, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,205 (Oct. 20, 1988). The Nasdaq market did not have fixed 
commissions, but had a similar type of rate making in the one-eighth securities trading 
convention, a structure found by the SEC to be anticompetitive in 1996. See Report Pur-
suant to Section 21(a) Regarding the NASD and Nasdaq Market, Exchange Act Release 
No. 37,542, 1996 WL 452691 (Aug. 8, 1996). 
 15. See PLI, THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1999, Corp. L. & Prac. Handbook B-1105, at 115–
19 (1999). 
 16. Exchange Act §§ 11A, 19(c). 
 17. Id. § 19(b). 
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counsel to investigative hearings.18 Since 1975, however, the SEC’s 
oversight of SROs has assured that all members of SROs would be 
treated fairly in connection with investigations and disciplinary proceed-
ings. SROs must provide a “fair procedure,” which includes bringing 
specific charges, notifying a person subject to discipline, giving him or 
her an opportunity to defend against such charges, and keeping a record. 
Further, in order to impose a sanction, there needs to be a statement set-
ting forth the act or practice in which the member engaged or omitted, 
the provision(s) of the regulation(s) violated, and the sanction and reason 
for its imposition.19 Sanctioned individuals have a right to appeal a deci-
sion to the SRO board or other committee.20 A further appeal to the SEC 
also is provided.21 In most respects, all of these due process rights are 
similar to the rights granted to persons subject to SEC disciplinary pro-
ceedings.22 
Whether or not securities industry SROs have become—or should be 
considered—government agencies for various purposes,23 the soft law of 
SROs, which began as private contract law between SROs and their 
listed companies and members, has been transformed into hard law and 
is legally binding upon public corporations and SRO members as a mat-
ter of federal securities regulation. Indeed, in some instances, SRO rules 
have been held to preempt state law.24 This hardening was a gradual 
                                                                                                                       
 18. See Villani v. New York Stock Exch., 348 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d 
Sloan v. NYSE, 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(7), 78o-3(h)(1) (2000). 
 20. In the case of the NASD, this committee has been the National Adjudicatory 
Council. See National Adjudicatory Council, FINRA Regulatory Enforcement (NAC), 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/Adjudication/NAC/index.htm (last visited Feb. 
17, 2009). 
 21. Exchange Act § 19(e)(2). 
 22. See SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2009). Prior to 1975, these proce-
dural rights were afforded to persons subject to NASD discipline, but not stock exchange 
discipline. See S. DOC. NO. 13, at 145 (1973). As pointed out by the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs when the 1975 Act Amendments were drafted, 
since the SROs “exercise government power . . . by imposing a disciplinary sanction, 
broadly defined, on a member or person affiliated with a member . . . [they] must be re-
quired to conform their activities to fundamental standards of due process.” S. REP. NO. 
94-75, at 24–25 (1975). The Committee also noted that SROs can adversely affect the 
interests of particular persons by denying membership to an applicant or requiring mem-
bers to cease doing business in specified ways. Id. 
 23. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations 
Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1128329. 
 24. See NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 488 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 
2007); Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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process, brought about by the Congressional and SEC view that SROs 
should not be private clubs, looking out for the interests of their mem-
bers, but public bodies, looking out for the interests of investors. 
From time to time, self-regulation has been seriously questioned due to 
stock market abuses that were not prevented,25 but SROs have continued 
to exist and formulate new standards of conduct under SEC oversight. 
These soft law standards come under the rubric of “just and equitable 
principles of trade.”26 The theory justifying self-regulation is that it is 
more flexible than government regulation and is based on a superior 
knowledge of industry practices and capabilities. Further, it can promote 
ethical as well as legal standards.27 These arguments also apply to the 
production of soft law in international financial regulation. But as can be 
seen from the experience of SRO regulation, soft law frequently hardens 
into statutes and government regulations, particularly when soft law is 
used for anticompetitive purposes or has been ineffective in preventing 
securities fraud. Despite some failings, soft law works well for securities 
regulation. Not surprisingly it has continued to work well as securities 
law has become international. 
B. Why Soft Law Works for International Securities Regulation 
The long history of national soft law securities regulation has contin-
ued in the international sphere out of necessity. Neither treaty law nor 
customary international law can provide the speed, flexibility, and exper-
tise that international securities regulation requires. The treaty process is 
not easy. Typically treaties take years to conclude.28 Thereafter, they 
                                                                                                                       
 25. See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 4, at 502 (1963); Report Pursuant to Section 
21(a) Regarding the NASD and Nasdaq Market, Exchange Act Release No. 37,542, 1996 
WL 452691 (Aug. 8, 1996). 
 26. See, e.g., Order Approving Rule Change by National Association of Securities 
Dealers, Inc. Relating to Limit Order Protection, Exchange Act Release No. 35,751, 1995 
WL 316674 (May 26, 1995) (discussing the “Manning decision” and approving amend-
ments to the NASD’s rule based on this case, which prohibits market makers from trad-
ing ahead of customer limit orders because the practice “is inconsistent with just and 
equitable principles of trade”). 
 27. See S. DOC. NO. 13, at 149 (1973). 
 28. See, e.g., Jason C. Nelson, The Contemporary Seabed Mining Regime: A Critical 
Analysis of the Mining Regulations Promulgated by the International Seabed Authority, 
16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 27, 30–34 (2005) (detailing the history of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1958 through 1994); S. Jacob Scherr & 
R. Juge Gregg, Johannesburg and Beyond: The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable De-
velopment and the Rise of Partnerships, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 432–33 
(2006) (discussing treaty-making stages of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants); David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
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need to be ratified by a number of countries in order to enter into force.29 
Ratification can be a long and complicated process in many countries 
and often may not occur.30 For example, the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) has been very successful in 
developing a number of treaties that have broad support such as the Unit-
ed Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978),31 the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (1980),32 and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) (“New York Convention”).33 
                                                                                                                       
Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 914 (2003) (discussing development of the U.N. Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, both spanning over a decade). 
 29. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 24(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (stating that “a treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be bound by 
the treaty has been established for all the negotiating States”); id. art. 2(b) (defining “rati-
fication” as “the international act so named whereby a State establishes . . . its consent to 
be bound”). 
 30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 
cmt. d (1987) (stating that the president may only ratify a treaty after the Senate gives its 
consent and ratification must be subject to any conditions imposed by the Senate); id. § 
312 cmt. j (stating that a treaty may not enter into force in the United States unless it is 
also in force internationally and even if the treaty is in force, “it will not be given effect 
as law of the United States” if it is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution). 
 31. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Status of Conventions and 
Model Laws, at 2, ¶ 4(c), A/CN.9/626 (May 25, 2007) [hereinafter Status of Conventions 
and Model Laws]. UNCITRAL’s Working Group III handled topics related to “interna-
tional legislation on shipping” and held eight sessions between 1970 and 1975. Working 
Group III, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/3Shipping.html 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2009). Following these sessions, a diplomatic conference adopted 
the Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea on March 31, 1978, but the treaty did not 
enter into force until November 1, 1992. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/Hamburg_ 
rules.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
 32. Status of Conventions and Model Laws, supra note 31, at 2, ¶ 4(d). UNCITRAL’s 
Working Group II held nine sessions between 1968 and 1978 to develop the Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”). Working Group II, http://www. 
uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Sale_of_Good.html (last visited Feb. 
12, 2009). The CISG was adopted on April 11, 1980, by a diplomatic conference, but did 
not enter into force until January 1, 1988. United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_ 
goods/1980CISG.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
 33. Status of Conventions and Model Laws, supra note 31, at 2, ¶ 4(j). See also Noah 
Rubins, The Enforcement and Annulment of International Arbitration Awards in Indone-
sia, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 359, 360 (2005) (noting that the New York Convention is 
“one of the most widely-ratified treaties in the world”). There was a draft New York 
Convention by early 1955, and the comment period lasted until 1958. Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Travaux Préparatoires, http://www. 
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The first two of these agreements took over twenty years to negotiate and 
enter into force, while the New York Convention took a mere four years 
to establish. Other efforts have resulted in treaties that failed to enter into 
force or gain widespread acceptance: the United Nations Convention on 
International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes 
(1988), which has five States parties but requires ten for entry into 
force;34 and the United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators 
of Transport Terminals in International Trade (1991), which has four 
signatories and requires five for entry into force.35 Thus, developing rules 
through formal international agreements is by no means swift or sure. 
Even when formal international agreements are reached, their place in 
domestic law is uncertain. In dualist countries, the international legal 
effect is separate and distinct from the national legal effect.36 In the Unit-
ed States, for example, unless the treaty is “self-executing” it lacks do-
mestic force until it is codified in domestic legislation.37 Whether a treaty 
is self-executing in the United States is not always clear. Recently, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, for example, found that the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Notification was not a self-executing treaty because the treaty 
text itself lacked a clear indication of such status.38 Thus, the treaty 
lacked force to override an inconsistent federal statute.39 Other dualist 
                                                                                                                       
uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_travaux.html (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2009). The New York Convention was completed and adopted on June 10, 1958, 
by diplomatic conference, and entered into force on June 7, 1959. Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
 34. Status of Conventions and Model Laws, supra note 31, at 2, ¶ 4(e). 
 35. Id. at 2, ¶ 4(f). See also Claire R. Kelly, Legitimacy and Law-Making Alliances, 
29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605 (2008) (discussing successes and failures of UNCITRAL’s trea-
ties). 
 36. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 32–33 (4th ed. 1990) 
(“[In dualist countries i]nternational law is a law between sovereign states: municipal law 
applies within a state and regulates the relations of its citizens with each other and with 
the executive.”); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy 
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 314 (1992) [hereinafter Jackson, Status of Treaties] 
(“[I]nternational treaties are part of a separate legal system from that of the domestic law 
. . . .”). 
 37. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
 38. In Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that the language of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Notification does not indicate by “explicit textual expression” 
that the treaty is self-executing. 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1361–62 (2008). 
 39. See id. at 1361 (“The Executive Branch has unfailingly adhered to its view that 
the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal law.”). The ratification 
history of the Convention on Consular Notification also does not suggest that either the 
Senate or the president intended that the Convention and any resultant International Court 
of Justice judgments would be immediately enforceable in U.S. domestic courts. Id. at 
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countries do not even recognize the possibility of a self-executing treaty 
and always require implementing legislation.40 
Customary international law develops in a different but equally ar-
duous fashion. Customary international laws are norms that most States 
follow out of a sense of obligation.41 They are not really custom; they are 
binding law.42 But parties can disagree as to whether a practice has risen 
to the level of customary international law.43 Identifying and tracking 
state practice on a particular issue takes time.44 Moreover, the require-
ment that States follow the norm out of a sense of obligation creates an 
interpretive ambiguity that can lead to disputes over what is customary 
international law.45 Not surprisingly, it takes time for norms to evolve to 
the point where most would agree that States follow the norms out of a 
                                                                                                                       
1360. Further, the relief sought by Medellin was not supported by “the postratification 
understanding” of any other Convention signatories. Id. at 1363. 
 40. Jackson, Status of Treaties, supra note 36, at 315 (discussing that dualist States 
require “act[s] of transformation” before treaty norms can be incorporated into domestic 
law). See also, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Judicialization: Can the European Model Be 
Exported to Other Parts of the World?, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 381, 391 (2004) (stating that, as 
a dualist country, Norway had to implement the Convention establishing the European 
Court of Human Rights into its domestic law to give the court legal effect); David Dy-
zenhaus, The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 127, 141–42 (2005) (noting that the dualist legal system of Canada requires par-
liamentary approval); Michael H. Lee, Revolution, Evolution, Devolution: Confusion? 
The Erosion of the “Supremacy of Parliament” and the Expanding Powers of the Courts 
in the United Kingdom, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 465, 466 (2000) (stating that 
treaties do not become part of domestic law in the United Kingdom unless the provisions 
are passed in an act of parliament). 
 41. MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL 
ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 53–54 (2d ed. 1997) (de-
scribing a pattern by which practices are “hardened” and become “generally regarded as 
obligatory”). See also North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 
1969 I.C.J. 4, 44 (Feb. 20) (“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled prac-
tice, [but] . . . [t]he States concerned must . . . [also] feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation.”); SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 379 (1958) (discussing that interna-
tional customary law primarily consists of a “psychological conception” that a practice 
should be followed out of obligation). 
 42. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 41, at 377 (noting that legally binding rules are 
manifestations of the general and gradual acceptance of international customs). 
 43. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
115, 142–43 (2005) (discussing the doctrine of “persistent objectors”). 
 44. See id. at 126–27. 
 45. See id. at 124–25 (noting the circularity of the subjective opinio juris requirement 
and the resultant vagueness regarding when a practice is customary). 
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sense of obligation.46 Some never agree.47 For example, the United States 
and Switzerland often disagree over the U.S. desires to prosecute insider 
trading and to seek information in connection with an alleged crime in 
the United States, where revealing that information would violate Swiss 
bank secrecy laws.48 The Swiss norms value bank secrecy, while the U.S. 
norms criminalize insider trading and support the production of evidence 
in connection with criminal activity.49 
Unlike treaty or customary international law, soft law is nonbinding 
law that can form in a variety of relatively timely ways. It may be devel-
oped through resolutions, practices, aspirational agreements, and the 
promulgation of norms in various forms that guide behavior.50 Although 
soft law is not customary international law—norms that most States fol-
low out of a sense of obligation—it can evolve into customary interna-
tional law and thus into hard law.51 International soft law may also 
evolve from self-regulatory bodies, such as the IASB, and voluntary in-
ternational standard-setting bodies, such as IOSCO. Paradoxically, soft 
law, while nonbinding, may also be found in treaties, which do bind. The 
parts of treaty law that are soft law (and thus nonbinding) are so because 
they are imprecise or lack an obligatory command.52 A treaty provision 
                                                                                                                       
 46. H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 1–2 
(1972) (stating that the development of customary international law is a “majestic” 
process). 
 47. E.g., Melynda J. Price, Balancing Lives: Individual Accountability and the Death 
Penalty as Punishment for Genocide (Lessons from Rwanda), 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
563, 566 & n.13 (2007) (discussing that there are varying viewpoints on the use of the 
death penalty); A. Mark Weisburd, Customary International Law and Torture: The Case 
of India, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81 (2001) (discussing differing opinions on torture). 
 48. See, e.g., Europe, U.S. Battle Swiss Bank Secrecy, BUS. WK., May 21, 2008, 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/may2008/gb20080521_571069.htm. 
 49. See infra notes 153–57 and accompanying text. 
 50. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L. ORG. 421, 421–23 (2000) [hereinafter Abbott & Snidal, Hard and 
Soft Law] (noting that most international law is soft and its form varies greatly depending 
on the purpose of the law). 
 51. Catherine Tinker, Responsibility for Biological Diversity Conservation Under 
International Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 777, 804 (1995) (stating that while soft 
law may not be binding, it “indicates[s] the direction in which the international communi-
ty is interested in moving and how far states are willing to go”). See also Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 420, 
428–29 (1991) (stating that soft law identifies future goals rather than current legal duties, 
but noting that parties often ascribe much importance to soft law instruments and nego-
tiate them as they would treaty provisions). 
 52. See, e.g., North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Sept. 8–14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993); North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 8–14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993). Abbott and 
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may speak in aspirational terms. For example, the Organization of Amer-
ican States (“OAS”) in its Inter-American Convention Against Corrup-
tion asks States parties to agree “to consider the applicability of measures 
within their own institutional system[].”53 Even though such aspirations 
are contained within a treaty, they are nonetheless “soft law.” Soft law, 
unlike customary international law or treaty law (hard law), does not 
purport to bind States. 
To understand the close relationship among these different sources of 
norms, it is helpful to compare hard and soft law more generally. Profes-
sors Abbott and Snidal explain hard and soft law through a legalization 
optic. Legalization refers to the degree of precision, obligation, and dele-
gation contained in any rule or norm.54 Rules or norms with high degrees 
of each of these characteristics reflect hard law; those instances where 
States have bound themselves to precise rules that can be adjudicated by 
a body having the authority to pass on the rules.55 Rules or norms that 
lack precision, obligation, and/or delegation are soft law.56 Thus, soft law 
may be “soft” because, although it is contained in a treaty and therefore 
has a high degree of obligation, it is not precise or lacks an interpretive 
forum.57 Alternatively, soft law may be precise in terms of its require-
ments, by establishing technical standards in a fair degree of detail, for 
example, but States may not commit to those standards as binding (even 
though they may use them consistently).58 
                                                                                                                       
Snidal reference these side agreements as instances where States used “hortatory or im-
precise provisions to deal with the difficult issues, allowing them to proceed with the rest 
of the bargain.” Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 50, at 445. See also the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 
324, as discussed in Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 401, 407 (2000). As the authors explain, the agreement “imposed binding treaty 
obligations, but most of its substantive commitments were expressed in general, even 
hortatory language and were not connected to an institutional framework with indepen-
dent authority.” Id. 
 53. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption 
art. III, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter IACAC]. 
 54. See Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 50, at 421–24 (discussing 
legalization along the continuum from hard law to soft law). 
 55. Id. at 421–22. 
 56. Id. at 422. 
 57. Id. at 441–43 (stating that precision and delegation can be reduced or even unat-
tainable in response to concerns regarding uncertainty, and referencing the Vienna Ozone 
Convention as legally binding yet imprecise and arms control agreements as “precise and 
binding[,] but limit[ing] delegation to forums that promote political bargaining”). 
 58. Id. at 442 (noting the advantages of hortatory rules utilizing precision to limit 
obligations and maintain flexibility). 
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The difficulty of developing international law through the treaty 
process or customary international law reveals the comparative advan-
tage of soft law. Soft law often evolves over time with less of a commit-
ment than treaty law. For example, the IOSCO nonfinancial disclosure 
standards took a decade to develop.59 The SEC adopted the substance of 
the IOSCO standards when it codified them through the regulatory 
process.60 Additionally, self-regulatory organizations that develop soft 
law build upon expertise and fashion norms through consensus. As a re-
sult, soft law norms face less resistance and thus may be better able to 
secure compliance. 
Soft law’s ability to secure compliance, despite its nonbinding status, 
enhances its appeal internationally. International rules developed through 
treaty, customary international law, or soft law may go unheeded. De-
spite pacta sunt servanda, the principle that agreements are to be obey-
ed,61 all international law sources generally face a compliance challenge. 
Treaties typically do not provide remedies for their breach and even 
where they do, parties usually retain the option to withdraw from the 
treaty altogether.62 Customary international law and soft law also lack 
explicit compliance mechanisms.63 Some claim that international law is 
                                                                                                                       
 59. See About IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=history (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2009) (detailing IOSCO’s formation in 1983 and ultimate adoption of the 
disclosure standards in 1998). 
 60. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 61. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29, art. 26 (“Every treaty 
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”). 
See also Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 53 (July 6) (separate opinion of 
Judge Lauterpacht) (stating that the obligation to act in good faith is “a general principle 
of law, [and] is also part of international law”); Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, supra note 29, art. 31(1) (stating that all treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith”); 
id. pmbl. (“[n]oting that the principle[] of . . . good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule 
are universally recognized”). 
 62. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29, art. 54 (stating that a 
party may withdraw from a treaty as provided in the treaty’s provisions or following con-
sultations with other signatories); id. art. 56 (stating that a party may withdraw from a 
treaty where its provisions do not indicate the right to withdrawal if the right was either 
intended or implied). 
 63. See George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law 
Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 544 (2005) (discussing whether States comply with custo-
mary international law out of a “sense of legal obligation,” or opinio juris); id. at 572 
(noting that in order for customary international law to maintain its dynamism and to 
evolve, it necessarily must not require total compliance). See also Charles K. Whitehead, 
What’s Your Sign?—International Norms, Signals, and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
695, 715–18 (2006) (discussing that compliance with soft law is a matter of relational 
theory rather than enforcement based). 
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not law at all because there is no means of enforcement.64 This claim 
overemphasizes coercion as a compliance tool.65 In international law, 
compliance can stem not only from coercion but also from self-interest66 
and/or from the sense that the law ought to be obeyed, i.e., the “legitima-
cy pull.” Some have argued that a State’s commitment to honor an inter-
national agreement exists whether that commitment comes in the form of 
treaty law or soft law.67 In fact, soft law may be followed more consis-
tently than a rule adopted by treaty or acknowledged as customary inter-
national law. Even when soft law rules eventually harden, there is often a 
great deal of regulatory discretion regarding enforcement. Thus, hard law 
rules are not necessarily more likely to be enforced simply because they 
are “hard law.” Rather, compliance stems from self-interest and legiti-
macy. 
In sum, treaties are not easy to conclude, their effect in domestic law 
often awaits domestic legislation, and compliance stems less from the 
written agreement and more from the compliance benefits or the recogni-
tion that the rules contained in those treaties are legitimate. So too with 
customary international law. Although its creation takes a different path 
than treaty law, it is still a cumbersome, complicated, and time-
consuming process. It is also fraught with ambiguities and disagreement. 
While soft law is certainly not free from ambiguities, its less threatening 
nature allows it to develop more swiftly. At the same time, it may be able 
to guide conduct as effectively as treaty or customary international law. 
It, too, must look to tangible benefits and legitimacy to secure com-
pliance. Soft law, however, has its own problems. Examining the interna-
tional organizations that create soft law, as well as how soft law develops 
and hardens, will help illustrate these problems. 
                                                                                                                       
 64. E.g., John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 7 (2000) (discussing that international law is not 
law because “there are certainly no agreed-upon enforcement, execution, or compliance 
mechanisms”). 
 65. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 217–18 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that identify-
ing binding obligations with the threat of punishment distorts the concepts of duty and 
obligation in international law). 
 66. See IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 37–38 (2007) [hereinafter HURD, AFTER ANARCHY] (noting 
that self-interest as a means of compliance is preferable to coercion because the latter 
necessarily “leaves the coerced worse off than before”). 
 67. JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 165–217 (1996) 
(arguing that soft law is no less binding than hard law by detailing various cases in which 
the World Court held that parties were legally bound to agreements or commitments re-
gardless of their form). 
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C. Important Soft Law Organizations 
There are a number of soft law norm generators in the securities field. 
It is helpful to understand how some of them are structured. 
1. IOSCO 
IOSCO is an “international association of securities regulators”68 with 
tremendous influence on the development of international norms for the 
regulation of securities.69 The IOSCO membership70 has agreed 
to cooperate together to promote high standards of regulation in order 
to maintain just, efficient and sound markets; to exchange information 
on their respective experiences in order to promote the development of 
domestic markets; to unite [their] efforts to establish standards and an 
effective surveillance of international securities transactions; and to 
provide mutual assistance to promote the integrity of the markets by a 
                                                                                                                       
 68. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2007), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/annual_report_2007/pdf/annual_report_2007.pdf [he-
reinafter IOSCO, ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 69. Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of 
U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 117 (2008) (citing Harold S. Bloomenthal 
& Samuel Wolff, International Organizations and Processes: International Organization 
of Securities Commissions—Background, 10 INT’L CAP. MARKETS & SEC. REG. 1:73 
(2006). Originally founded as the “Inter-American Conference of Securities Commis-
sions” in 1974, it became IOSCO in 1983 when its membership expanded beyond North 
and South American securities regulators. About IOSCO, supra note 59. 
 70. IOSCO’s membership is broken down into three categories: “ordinary” members 
(who possess a single vote); “associate” members (who do not possess voting power and 
may not become members of the Executive Committee, though they are eligible to be-
come members of the Presidents Committee); and “affiliate” members (who possess no 
vote and cannot become members of either the Executive Committee or the Presidents 
Committee). There are currently 109 ordinary members, eleven associate members, and 
seventy-one affiliate members. See IOSCO Membership Lists, http://www.iosco.org 
/lists/index.cfm?section=general (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (follow “Ordinary,” “Asso-
ciate,” and “Affiliate” hyperlinks for individual lists). Ordinary membership is available 
to securities commissions and similar government bodies, and in the event that a given 
jurisdiction does have a regulatory government body, a self-regulatory body (e.g., a stock 
exchange) may become eligible. IOSCO, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 37. Ordinary 
members include the SEC, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), 
and Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission. IOSCO Membership Lists, supra. 
Associate membership is available to public regulatory bodies of countries that are al-
ready ordinary members: the Commodity Futures Trading Commissions (“CFTC”) is a 
notable example. Affiliate membership is available to SROs and international bodies with 
“an appropriate interest in securities regulation,” IOSCO, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
68, at 37, including the London Stock Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, and the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”). IOSCO Membership Lists, supra. 
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rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement 
against offenses.71 
The resulting dialogue established at IOSCO has led to a set of prin-
ciples and best practices for securities regulation.72 For example, 
IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation73 (“OPSR”) 
sets forth thirty principles of securities regulation based upon three ob-
jectives: (1) the protection of investors; (2) ensuring that markets are fair, 
efficient, and transparent; and (3) the reduction of systemic risk.74 The 
principles promulgated by IOSCO are nonbinding on its members, 
though members undertake “to use their best endeavors within their ju-
risdiction to ensure adherence” to the organization’s principles.75 The 
nonbinding nature of IOSCO’s resolutions is reflective of the organiza-
tion’s predilection towards flexibility.76 
IOSCO is set apart from many other international regulatory organiza-
tions insofar as it has become formalized enough to justify a general se-
cretariat, even though it merits “no place on the landscape of the interna-
tional legal system.”77 The General Secretariat, based in Madrid, Spain, 
organizes IOSCO’s business (including the collection of dues and plan-
ning of annual conferences)78 and handles all requests for information 
from members and nonmembers.79 IOSCO has a number of commit-
tees,80 but the Technical Committee is responsible for developing finan-
                                                                                                                       
 71. IOSCO, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 3. 
 72. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 53–54 (2004). 
 73. The OPSR was originally adopted in 1998 and amended in May 2003. Int’l Org. 
of Sec. Comm’ns [IOSCO], Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (2003), 
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf. 
 74. Id. at i. 
 75. Id. at 3. 
 76. The essence of this flexibility is captured in the OPSR’s declaration that “there is 
often no single correct approach to a regulatory issue” and, therefore, local developments 
and history must be taken into account in order for members to implement the organiza-
tion’s principles domestically. Id. 
 77. SLAUGHTER, supra note 72, at 38. 
 78. IOSCO, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 37. 
 79. David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administra-
tion, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547, 563 (2005). While IOSCO’s administration is lodged with the 
General Secretariat, its regulatory standards are created through its committees. Cheryl 
Nichols, The Importance of Selective Federal Preemption in the U.S. Securities Regula-
tory Framework: A Lesson from Canada, Our Neighbor to the North, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 
391, 406 (2006). 
 80. There are ten IOSCO committees. IOSCO, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 35. 
The Presidents’ Committee is composed of the presidents of regular and associate mem-
ber agencies, meets annually, and “has all the powers necessary or convenient to achieve 
the purpose of IOSCO.” Id. at 34. The Executive Committee is composed of nineteen 
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cial regulatory standards and recommendations of best practices, and has 
therefore garnered the majority of IOSCO’s press.81 It has been characte-
rized by one commentator as the place where “most of the important 
work is done.”82 Its meetings are closed to the public and its work is di-
vided into five subject areas, each deliberated upon by a working group: 
(1) multinational disclosure and accounting, (2) regulation of secondary 
markets, (3) regulation of market intermediaries, (4) enforcement and the 
exchange of information, and (5) investment management.83 After re-
viewing the issues in each of these defined areas, the recommendations 
of these working groups are forwarded to the Presidents and Executive 
Committees, where they are ultimately promulgated.84 
                                                                                                                       
members, meets periodically, is “subject to the By-Laws of IOSCO, [and] takes all deci-
sions and undertakes all actions necessary or convenient to achieve the objectives of 
IOSCO.” Id. Membership of the Executive Committee is comprised of “the Chairmen of 
the Technical and Emerging Markets Committees, the Chairmen of each Regional Com-
mittee, one ordinary member elected by each Regional Committee from among the ordi-
nary members elected by the Presidents Committee, and nine ordinary members elected 
by the Presidents Committee.” Id. The Executive Committee consists of two highly spe-
cialized working committees: the Technical Committee and the Emerging Markets Com-
mittee. IOSCO Working Committees, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section= 
workingcmts (last visited Mar. 18, 2009). The Technical Committee is composed of fi-
nancial regulators from the world’s most developed markets, and its stated objective is 
“to review major regulatory issues related to international securities and futures transac-
tions and to coordinate practical responses to these concerns.” Id. Membership currently 
includes representatives from the SEC, the CFTC, and the FSA. Id. (follow “Executive 
Committee” hyperlink). The Emerging Markets Committee was established to promote 
efficiency in the world’s emerging securities and futures markets through the establish-
ment of standards and principles. Id. The SRO Consultative Committee (“SROCC”) is 
comprised of self-regulatory organizations that are affiliate members, and its primary 
function is to provide information regarding SRO rules and regulations to individuals 
contemplating investment in the global securities market. Nichols, supra note 79, at 407. 
The SROCC also interacts with the Technical Committee in order to provide information 
about domestic markets to aid in the drafting of regulatory initiatives. See IOSCO, 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68. 
 81. Zaring, supra note 79, at 564. 
 82. SLAUGHTER, supra note 72, at 227. 
 83. IOSCO, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68. 
 84. Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: 
Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT’L. 
L. 207, 240 (1999). 
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2. IASB 
The IASB is “an independent, privately-funded accounting standard 
setter based in London, [United Kingdom].”85 It was created to meet the 
increasing demand for international accounting rules.86 Its goal is “to 
provide the world’s integrating capital markets with a common language 
for financial reporting”87 through the creation of a universal, understand-
able, and enforceable set of accounting standards.88 
The oversight of the IASB, which includes the appointment of its 
members and fundraising, is handled by the twenty-two trustees of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation (“IASC”).89 
In the interest of ensuring that the makeup of the board of trustees re-
flects the diversity of the world’s capital markets, six trustees must be 
appointed from North America, Europe, and the Asia/Oceania region, 
respectively, and the remaining four trustees can come from anywhere so 
long as the “overall geographical balance” is maintained.90 
The IASB is comprised of fourteen members, twelve on a full-time ba-
sis and two on a part-time basis, and unlike the IASC trustees, member-
ship is not based upon geographical criteria.91 The most important quali-
                                                                                                                       
 85. About the IASB, http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+the+IASB/About+the+ 
IASB.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2009). The IASB is the standard-setting body of IASC 
Foundation. Int’l Accounting Standards Comm. [IASC], IASC Foundation Constitution 
14, available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/1904AEEE-3554-49C6-BD96-A46 
11A6964BE/0/IASCFoundationConstitution2.pdf [hereinafter IASC, Constitution]. The 
IASB exists under the umbrella of its parent entity, the IASC, a not-for-profit corporation 
incorporated in the State of Delaware. About the IASB, supra. The IASC was formed in 
1973 through an agreement among nine national accounting bodies: Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Holland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Mark J. Hanson, Becoming One: The SEC Should Join the World in Adopting the Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 521, 524 
(2006). The IASC was criticized for being a part-time accounting principle setter whose 
structure would hinder its ability to promulgate fair and efficient global accounting stan-
dards, so it overhauled its infrastructure, creating the IASB and delegating most of the 
technical rulemaking power to it. Id. at 524–25. 
 86. Walter Mattli & Tim Buthe, Global Private Governance: Lessons from a Nation-
al Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 228 
(2005). 
 87. INT’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., IASB AND THE IASC FOUNDATION: WHO WE 
ARE AND WHAT WE DO 1 (2008), available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/0A5A 
767C-E7DE-49E5-8B12-499F62F8870C/0/WhoWeAre_Final12508.pdf. 
 88. International Accounting Standards Board—About Us, http://www.iasb.org/ 
About+Us/International+Accounting+Standards+Board+-+About+Us.htm (last visited Mar. 
14, 2009). 
 89. IASC, Constitution, supra note 85, at 19. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 18. 
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fications for membership are that individuals shall have the professional 
and practical experience to ensure that the membership is comprised of 
“the best available combination of technical expertise and diversity of 
international business and market experience in order to contribute to the 
development of high quality, global accounting standards.”92 Each mem-
ber possesses a single vote, and nine votes are required for the promulga-
tion of any standard.93 
The IASB is solely responsible for drafting and promulgating Interna-
tional Accounting Standards (“IAS”), most notably IFRS. However, the 
IASB consults with two other bodies, the Standards Advisory Council 
(“SAC”) and the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Com-
mittee (“IFRIC”), and reports to the IASC. The SAC is responsible for 
providing comments and advice on the development of IASB projects, 
and IFRIC is charged with reviewing any potential accounting concerns 
that arise from IASB projects, though any interpretation that it proffers is 
subject to the approval of the IASB.94 The IASB’s meetings are open to 
the public (as well as publicly available on its website).95 It also solicits 
public comments on its standards.96 
The IASB is also given the authority by the IASC to “have full discre-
tion in developing and pursuing the technical agenda of the IASB and 
over project assignments on technical matters: in organising the conduct 
of its work, the IASB may outsource detailed research or other work to 
                                                                                                                       
 92. Id. Current board members include Professor Mary E. Barth from the Stanford 
University Graduate School of Business, Stephen Cooper from the UBS Investment Bank 
in London, and Tatsumi Yamada, a former Partner of ChuoAoyama Audit Corporation 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers) in Japan. See About IASB: Board Members, http://www.iasb. 
org/About+Us/About+the+IASB/IASB+members.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). 
 93. DOUGLAS R. CARMICHAEL, RAY WHITTINGTON & LYNFORD GRAHAM, ACCOUNT-
ANTS’ HANDBOOK 907 (11th ed. 2007). 
 94. Mattli & Buthe, supra note 86, at 251. 
 95. INT’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., DUE PROCESS HANDBOOK ¶ 68 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/7D97095E-96FD-4F1F-B7F2-366527CB4FA 
7/0/DueProcessHandbook.pdf [hereinafter IASB, DUE PROCESS HANDBOOK]. Information 
on IASB meetings can be found at IASB Meetings, http://www.iasb.org/Meetings/ 
Meetings+Page.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). 
 96. IASB, DUE PROCESS HANDBOOK, supra note 95, ¶¶ 94–98 (discussing public 
comments on published proposals and exposure drafts, and duration of comment periods); 
id. ¶¶ 103–06 (discussing IASB’s usage of public hearings, round-table discussions, and 
the possibility that IASB will send representatives to meetings initiated by the public to 
address concerns about the organization’s agenda). For documents currently open to public 
comment, see International Accounting Standards Board—Open to Comment, http://www. 
iasb.org/Open+to+Comment/International+Accounting+Standards+Board+-+Open+to+Com 
ment.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). 
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national standard setters or other organizations.”97 One notable example 
of this is the fact that IFRS were originally a recommendation of 
IOSCO.98 
Due to the fact that the IASB derives its funding from private sector 
firms, some commentators have argued that the international accounting 
standards that it promulgates are rife with potential conflicts of interest.99 
Since the IASB’s funding and budgetary concerns are handled by the 
IASC, it may be argued that the IASB’s members are insulated from the 
influence of the donors.100 
3. OECD 
The OECD, an international organization with its general secretariat 
headquartered in Paris, France, “provides a forum where governments 
can compare and exchange policy experiences, identify good practices 
and promote decisions and recommendations” with respect to “the eco-
nomic, social and governance challenges that can accompany [globaliza-
tion].”101 As others have pointed out, it is a forum for national regulators 
to tackle common problems.102 The OECD develops guidelines and mod-
els of best practices, and sometimes formal agreements.103 
The thirty market democracies that comprise the OECD’s current 
membership are represented by ambassadors, and unlike many interna-
tional organizations, membership is contingent upon approval by the 
Council of members following the “accession process.”104 The OECD is 
                                                                                                                       
 97. IASC, Constitution, supra note 85, at 20. 
 98. See Hanson, supra note 85, at 526. IOSCO released an “International Equity Of-
fers” report in 1989, which “called for a single worldwide securities disclosure document 
that would use internationally accepted accounting standards.” Id. 
 99. Caroline Bradley, Private International Law-Making for the Financial Markets, 
29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 127, 178 (2005) (quoting Charlie McCreevy, European Comm’r 
for Internal Mkt. & Servs., Governance and Accountability in Fin. Servs., Speech at the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of European Parliament, Brussels (Feb. 2, 
2005)) (“The standard setters are currently sponsored by voluntary contributions from 
contributors ranging from central banks to listed companies, which raises potential issues 
of conflict of interest.”). 
 100. Nevertheless, some commentators have admonished that the case of the FASB 
and Sarbanes-Oxley in the United States provides a strong argument that “alternative 
sources of funding are required to guarantee effective independence.” Mattli & Buthe, 
supra note 86, at 254. 
 101. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 10, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/19/40556222.pdf. 
 102. SLAUGHTER, supra note 72, at 17. 
 103. See id. 
 104. OECD, Members and Partners, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_ 
36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2009). The “accession process” in-
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funded by contributions from its member countries, which are based 
upon a percentage of the member’s economy.105 
The OECD largely functions through its General Secretariat, specia-
lized committees, and the Council.106 There are approximately 200 spe-
cialized committees, working groups, and expert groups, all of which are 
comprised of representatives from member countries that discuss, ex-
change information, and evaluate the progress of policy areas ranging 
from economics to employment and education.107 The Council is where 
“decision-making power is vested.”108 “It is made up of one representa-
tive per member country, plus a representative from the European Com-
mission.”109 Council meetings involve discussion of key issues and lead 
to the delegation of work projects to the General Secretariat.110 The 
OECD has described the manner in which it functions as “consist[ing] of 
a highly effective process that begins with data collection and analysis 
and moves on to collective discussion of policy, then decision-making 
and implementation.”111 
None of these organizations develop soft law in the same way; thus, it 
is helpful to consider some concrete examples of how soft law develops 
and how it subsequently hardens. Although a variety of international or-
ganizations, primarily SROs, trade associations, and international banks, 
develop soft securities regulation, IOSCO, the IASB, and the OECD are 
the bodies focused upon in this Article.112 
                                                                                                                       
volves a review by the Council where the applicant must show “attachment to the basic 
values shared by all OECD members: an open market economy, democratic pluralism 
and respect for human rights.” The applicant must also “state its position vis-à-vis the 
OECD ‘legal instruments’ (meaning the Decisions, Recommendations and Declarations 
adopted within the framework of the Organisation).” OECD, Becoming a Member of the 
OECD: The Accession Process, http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3343,en_2649_344 
89_1958091_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009). 
 105. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD 12 (2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/33/34011915.pdf (“The largest contributor is the Unit-
ed States, which provides approximately 25% of the budget, followed by Japan.”). 
 106. Id. at 11. The general secretariat is comprised of 2,500 staff members (“in-
clud[ing] about 700 economists, lawyers, scientists and other professionals”), and its 
primary function is to perform research and analysis requested by its member countries. 
Id. at 12. 
 107. Id. at 11. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 13. 
 112. CESR is composed of representatives from the securities regulatory agencies of 
the EU and functions as a coordinating and advisory group under the European Commis-
sion. CESR’s determinations are soft law, but CESR is influential in formulating a Euro-
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II. STORIES ABOUT THE HARDENING OF SOFT LAW 
A. IFRS113 
The U.S. federal securities laws establish mandatory disclosure of the 
business and financial affairs of all companies that make public offerings 
of securities in the United States or that have 500 shareholders and $10 
million in assets and trade in the U.S. securities markets. Public offering 
documents must include audited financial statements prepared according 
to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), and publicly 
traded companies must file annual and periodic reports that include au-
dited annual financial statements prepared according to U.S. GAAP.114 
Although it has been argued for some time that international accounting 
standards would better serve the needs of investors in the global capital 
markets,115 the SEC has been slow to accept any non-U.S. GAAP finan-
cial statements for SEC filings. But in response to pressures from the 
European Union and foreign issuers, the SEC is currently in the process 
of shifting its requirements from U.S. GAAP to IFRS. Although account-
ing standards are promulgated by private sector bodies, they become 
hard law when regulators require their inclusion in financial statements 
given to investors. 
The most important part of an SEC registration statement is the pros-
pectus circulated to investors. Information required in a prospectus is 
specified in § 7 of the Securities Act.116 Under § 19(a) of the Securities 
                                                                                                                       
pean position with regard to securities regulation in the EU. CESR has played an impor-
tant role in the convergence of accounting standards between the United States and the 
EU and may be utilized in development of international standards for credit rating agen-
cies. See CESR in Short, http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=cesrinshort&mac=0&id= 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2009). See also supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 113. A more comprehensive analysis of this topic, arguing that the EU was instrumen-
tal in moving the SEC to recognizing IFRS, can be found at Roberta S. Karmel, The EU 
Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM J. INT’L L. 1692 (2008). 
 114. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2008). 
 115. See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the Barriers to 
Global Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85 (2007); Roberta S. Karmel & Mary S. Head, 
Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry into U.S. Markets, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1207 
(1993); Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to 
U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007); Edward 
F. Greene, Beyond Borders Part II: A New Approach to the Regulation of Global Securi-
ties Offerings (2007), http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/2000/2007_0501_ 
GreeneBeyondT.pdf; Edward F. Greene & Linda C. Quinn, Building on the International 
Convergence of the Global Markets: A Model for Securities Law Reform, 1372 PLI/CORP 
561 (Nov. 15, 2001, revised Aug. 2002). 
 116. 15 U.S.C. § 77g. 
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Act, the SEC may adopt rules and regulations and define terms.117 Pur-
suant to this authority, the SEC has adopted forms for the registration of 
securities offerings, regulations specifying the narrative contents of such 
forms, and the accounting statements required to be included in SEC fil-
ings.118 The SEC’s rulemaking power is very broad and gives the SEC 
authority to formulate accounting principles, but the SEC has delegated 
this authority to the accounting profession, specifically the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (“FASB”), by recognizing its standards as “au-
thoritative” for filed documents.119 In Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress set forth 
requirements as to board composition, funding, and other matters for a 
body that would promulgate accounting standards that the SEC could 
recognize as “authoritative.”120 Such a body is required to be from the 
private sector, rather than a government body. The IASB is such a pri-
vate sector body, although, as will be explained below, its governance 
was changed at the insistence of the SEC so that the SEC could eventual-
ly recognize its standards as “authoritative.” 
The SEC generally requires foreign (that is, non-U.S.) issuers that pub-
licly raise capital in the United States or list their shares on a U.S. securi-
ties exchange to comply with the registration requirements of the Securi-
ties Act and the Exchange Act, unless appropriate exemptions from  
registration are available. Although the SEC’s approach to foreign issuer 
disclosure is essentially a national treatment approach, the SEC has de-
signed special registration forms for foreign issuers that relax some of 
the rigors of the registration process.121 In October 1999, the SEC 
amended the foreign issuer disclosure forms to substantially replace the 
nonfinancial disclosure requirements with disclosure standards endorsed 
by IOSCO.122 The development of these international disclosure stan-
                                                                                                                       
 117. Id. § 77s(a). 
 118. Form S-1 is the general form of registration statement; Form S-3 is a form for 
seasoned issuers. Regulation S-K, specifying the contents of such forms, is set forth at 17 
C.F.R. §§ 229.101 et seq. Regulation S-X, specifying the contents of accounting state-
ments, is set forth at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01 et seq. 
 119. Accounting Series Release No. 150, 1973 WL 149263 (Dec. 20, 1973), updated 
in Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of FASB as a Designated 
Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 8221 (Apr. 25, 2003). The 
SEC has specified the contents of financial statements and other information for Securi-
ties Act registration statements, and Exchange Act filings in Regulation S-K and Regula-
tion S-X. 
 120. Securities Act § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)(1). 
 121. Form 20-F is the core document authorized by the SEC for use by foreign issuers. 
17 C.F.R. § 249.220f. Forms F-1 and F-3 are registration forms for foreign private issu-
ers. 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.31, 239.33. 
 122. See International Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release No. 7745, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 53,900, 53,903 (Oct. 5, 1999). 
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dards by IOSCO was an important step in the convergence of U.S. and 
EU narrative and financial disclosure standards, and influenced Asian 
and other countries to move toward international accounting standards. 
In adopting IOSCO’s disclosure standards for foreign private issuers, 
the SEC significantly changed the form, although not the content, of pre-
vious disclosure standards.123 At that time, the SEC did not change its 
accounting disclosure regulations for foreign private issuers, which were 
still required to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. GAAP. The 
SEC nevertheless issued a Concept Release requesting comments to de-
termine under what conditions it would accept financial statements of 
foreign private issuers prepared using international accounting stan-
dards.124 
Previously, in 1988, the SEC “explicitly supported the establishment of 
. . . international accounting standards . . . to reduce regulatory impedi-
ments [] result[ing] from disparate national accounting standards,” but 
continued to reject a mutual recognition approach.125 But at this time, the 
SEC decided not to adopt a process-oriented approach to IASB stan-
dards, recognizing them as “authoritative” and therefore comparable to 
U.S. GAAP standards promulgated by the FASB. However, after a dec-
ade of considering IASB standards, the SEC’s 2000 Concept Release 
was part of an assessment process possibly leading to the SEC’s accep-
tance of IFRS. IOSCO, as well as the SEC and others, were working on 
financial disclosure harmonization, and by May 2000, IOSCO had as-
sessed all thirty core standards in the IASB work program and recom-
mended to its members that multinational issuers use the core standards, 
supplemented by reconciliation, and such disclosure interpretation as 
might be necessary.126 
At this time, the SEC was not concerned about particular IFRS stan-
dards, with a few exceptions, but it questioned whether these standards 
could be rigorously interpreted and applied.127 In particular, the SEC crit-
icized the structure and financing of the IASB and took a heavy hand in 
restructuring it. A new constitution was adopted in May 2000 that estab-
                                                                                                                       
 123. See id. at 53,908. 
 124. International Accounting Standards Concept Release, Securities Act Release No. 
7801, 65 Fed. Reg. 8896 (Feb. 23, 2000) [hereinafter IAS Concept Release]. 
 125. Conrad W. Hewitt, Chief Accountant, & John W. White, Director, Division of 
Corporation Finance, Testimony Concerning Globally Accepted Accounting Standards, 
Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance and Investment of the Sen. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Oct. 24, 2007), available at www.sec.gov/news/ 
testimony/2007/ts102407cwh-jww.htm. 
 126. See Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IASC Standards (May 17, 2000), 
available at http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS26.pdf. 
 127. See IAS Concept Release, supra note 124, at 8901–02. 
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lished this body as an independent organization with two main bodies, 
the Trustees and the Board, as well as a Standing Interpretations Com-
mittee and a Standards Advisory Council.128 The Trustees appoint the 
Board Members, exercise oversight, and fundraise, whereas the Board 
has sole responsibility for setting accounting standards. The Chairman of 
the Nominating Committee established for the purpose of selecting the 
initial Trustees for the restructured IASB was then-SEC Chairman Ar-
thur Levitt, Jr. The Chairman selected to head the new body of Trustees 
was Paul A. Volker, Former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Board.129 
It appeared that, despite SEC staff reservations about IFRS, momen-
tum for mutual recognition of accounting standards based on conver-
gence, if not harmonization, was moving along.130 But the spirit of coop-
eration that had been established between the SEC and the IASB was 
unfortunately dampened by the stock market collapse of 2000–2001 and 
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley dealing with the structure of audit committees and the registration 
and regulation of auditors by the newly created Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) were met with strenuous objec-
tions abroad because they were applicable to foreign issuers and their 
auditors. Relations between U.S. and foreign regulators soured to some 
extent, and the SEC became too preoccupied with implementing various 
mandates in Sarbanes-Oxley, and structuring necessary accommodations 
for foreign auditors and audit committees, to focus on mutual recognition 
in financial disclosure.131 
                                                                                                                       
 128. See Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in 
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to 
U.S. GAAP, Securities Act Release No. 8818, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,962, 37,964. (July 11, 
2007) [hereinafter Acceptance of IFRS Proposing Release]. 
 129. IASC Trustees Announce New Standard-Setting Board to Reach Goal of Global 
Accounting Standards, BUS. WIRE, Jan. 25, 2001. 
 130. Donald T. Nicolaisen, A Securities Regulator Looks at Convergence, 25 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 661 (2005). 
 131. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the PCAOB and directed public accounting 
firms that participate in audits of SEC reporting companies to register with the PCAOB 
and become subject to PCAOB audit rules and inspection. Sarbanes-Oxley, §§ 102–04, 
15 U.S.C. § 7212 (2004). These provisions applied on their face to foreign auditors, a 
situation that created conflict between the SEC and foreign regulators. In order to ameli-
orate these problems, the PCAOB stated its intention to cooperate with non-U.S. regulators 
in accomplishing the goals of the statute without subjecting non-U.S. public accounting 
firms to unnecessary burdens or conflicting requirements. See Final Rules Relating to the 
Oversight of Non-U.S. Public Accounting Firms, PCAOB Release No. 2004–005, at 2–3 
(June 9, 2004), www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_013/2004-06-09_Release_2004-005.pdf. 
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The European Union then seized the initiative with respect to interna-
tional accounting standards, undermining those European issuers that had 
been considering reporting in U.S. GAAP rather than their home country 
GAAP, by mandating that all listed companies report in IFRS and threat-
ening to make U.S. EU-listed companies also report in IFRS. Moreover, 
Asian and other issuers also began looking at IFRS, rather than U.S. 
GAAP, as an alternative to reporting in their national GAAPs for offer-
ings in the international capital markets.132 As the markets in Europe and 
Asia strengthened, relative to the U.S. markets, New York was no longer 
the only place where multinational corporations could raise capital, and 
the SEC was no longer a regulator that could force its regulations on for-
eign issuers. 
In April 2005, the Chief Accountant of the SEC set forth a “roadmap” 
for eliminating the need for non-U.S. companies to reconcile to U.S. 
GAAP financial statements prepared according to IFRS.133 This roadmap 
was explicitly affirmed by successive SEC chairmen in meetings with 
EU Internal Market Commissioner Charlie McCreevy.134 
On July 2, 2007, the SEC issued a release proposing to accept from 
foreign private issuers financial statements prepared in accordance with 
IFRS.135 In that release, the SEC pointed out that almost 100 countries, 
including the twenty-seven EU Member States, were using IFRS, with 
more countries considering adopting IFRS.136 The SEC made two argu-
ments in favor of allowing foreign issuers to report in IFRS, which were 
a somewhat remarkable turnabout from its prior resistance to a foreign 
GAAP. First, the SEC asserted that it had long advocated reducing the 
disparity between U.S. accounting and disclosure regulations and those 
of other countries as a means to facilitate cross-border capital formation. 
Second, the SEC asserted that an international accounting standard may 
be adequate for investor protection even if it is not the same as the U.S. 
standard.137 Therefore, based on increasing convergence between U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS, and cooperation among the SEC, IOSCO, and CESR, 
                                                                                                                       
 132. Sir David Tweedie & Thomas R. Seidenstein, Setting a Global Standard: The 
Case for Accounting Convergence, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 589, 593 (2005). 
 133. Nicolaisen, supra note 130. 
 134. See Press Release, SEC, No. 2006-17, Accounting Standards: SEC Chairman Cox 
and EU Commissioner McCreevy Affirm Commitment to Elimination of the Need for 
Reconciliation Requirements (Feb. 8, 2006), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-
17.htm; Press Release, SEC, No. 2005-62, Chairman Donaldson Meets with EU Internal 
Market Commissioner McCreevy (Apr. 21, 2005), available at www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2005-62.htm. 
 135. Acceptance of IFRS Proposing Release, supra note 128. 
 136. Id. at 37,965. 
 137. Id. at 37,965–66. 
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the SEC proposed amendments to its rules that would allow a foreign 
private issuer to file financial statements without reconciliation to U.S. 
GAAP, if those financial statements are in full compliance with the Eng-
lish language version of IFRS as published by the IASB.138 The SEC also 
then issued a Concept Release proposing possible reporting in IFRS by 
U.S. corporations.139 The SEC adopted final rules permitting foreign is-
suers to report in IFRS, substantially as proposed, based primarily on the 
progress of the IASB and the FASB toward convergence, their expressed 
intention to work toward further convergence in the future, and a finding 
that IFRS are high-quality standards.140 
The interplay and negotiations among the SEC, IOSCO, the EU, 
CESR, and the IASB leading to the SEC’s acceptance of IFRS were ar-
duous and complex. As a practical matter, this is not a result that could 
have been accomplished by treaty. Further, whether IFRS is soft or hard 
law is debatable, but once it becomes the accounting standard for SEC 
filings, adherence to IFRS is legally binding for public companies regu-
lated by the SEC. Moreover, it already is legally required for EU confir-
mations. 
B. MOUs 
Although growth of the global capital markets has proceeded rapidly, 
and linkages between various markets have become quite efficient, the 
harmonization of regulation, surveillance, and enforcement has pro-
gressed at a much slower pace. As was stated in a congressional report in 
1989, and continues to be true, there is “no global regulatory structure to 
                                                                                                                       
 138. Id. at 37,970. 
 139. Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to Prepare Financial Statements in 
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, Securities Act Release No. 
8831, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,600 (Aug. 14, 2007), corrected 72 Fed. Reg. 53,509 (Sept. 19, 
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(Nov. 21, 2008). 
 140. Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in 
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to 
U.S. GAAP, Securities Act Release No. 8879, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4, 2008). 
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oversee the markets and coordinate harmonization of laws and regula-
tions to ensure efficiency and honesty. Therefore, securities regulators in 
each nation must work with their foreign counterparts to seek coordi-
nated international solutions to assure fairer as well as more efficient 
market operations across borders.”141 One consequence of the dramatic 
increase in foreign participation in U.S. securities markets is the in-
creased opportunity for transnational securities fraud. 
The SEC has been particularly concerned about insider trading, market 
manipulation, and financial fraud where information and evidence relat-
ing to suspicious conduct is located beyond the agency’s jurisdictional 
reach. Many foreign countries have secrecy or blocking statutes that pro-
hibit the disclosure of information. Bank secrecy laws provide (criminal) 
sanctions against banks that breach client confidentiality.142 Blocking 
laws prevent evidence gathering under U.S. law in foreign jurisdictions. 
A blocking statute forbids the communication of information except as 
provided by treaty or international agreement.143 It would generally apply 
to domestic courts and prevent such courts from forwarding information 
to another jurisdiction. Therefore, even if a subpoena can be served on a 
foreign bank, the bank is prohibited by secrecy or blocking statutes from 
giving the SEC any information pursuant to its national law. 
For example, in SEC v. Tome, there was substantial insider trading in 
the common stock and options of St. Joe Minerals shortly before a tender 
offer by Seagram.144 The day before the tender offer was announced, ac-
counts at Banca Della Swizzera Italiana (“BSI”) purchased 3000 shares 
and options for over 100,000 shares. Showing a strong probability of in-
sider trading, the SEC obtained a temporary restraining order and a 
freeze order on profits in BSI’s account at Irving Trust. The SEC did not 
know the identity of BSI’s customers and did not identify them in the 
complaint. BSI refused to disclose their identity because of Swiss bank 
secrecy laws. The SEC obtained a discovery order on the basis that it 
would be a “travesty of justice” for foreign companies to “invade Ameri-
can markets, violate American laws . . . , withdraw profits, and resist ac-
                                                                                                                       
 141. H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 3 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888. 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 
1983). See also Ralph C. Ferrara & Triplett Mackintosh, Legal Representation in the 
International Securities Market: Representing a Party or Witness in an SEC or SRO Pro-
ceeding, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 912–13 (1989). 
 143. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aeros-Patiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. 
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 526 n.6 (1987); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL 
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 773–75 (2d ed. 2002); Ferrara & Mackintosh, supra note 
142, at 910, 915–16. 
 144. 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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countability.”145 BSI’s client turned out to be an Italian national operat-
ing a firm in Switzerland, and the SEC was able to permanently enjoin 
him and order disgorgement of over $4 million in profits.146 In this case, 
the SEC was able to crack Swiss bank secrecy laws, but it was able to do 
so only because it froze the profits of illegal activity so soon after trading 
on inside information. 
International agreements for the production of evidence can be used to 
obtain evidence abroad, even from banks in countries that have secrecy 
or blocking statutes, but the pursuit of evidence under these agreements 
is painfully slow and makes it difficult for the SEC or other securities 
commissions to proceed. The first U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
entered into force with Switzerland in 1977.147 The United States then 
entered into treaties to provide mutual assistance in criminal matters with 
many other countries.148 The SEC was able to make use of the Swiss 
treaty in the Santa Fe case.149 
After the entry of a preliminary injunction in 1981, the SEC sought to 
learn the identities of certain account holders who had directed purchases 
of Santa Fe stock and options through Swiss banks just prior to the an-
nouncement of a merger, making a profit of $6.2 million.150 The Swiss 
banks refused to respond to the SEC request. In March 1982, the SEC 
submitted a request for assistance under the Swiss Treaty with the United 
States.151 In May 1984, the request was finally granted, and in February 
1986, the SEC was successful in obtaining disgorgement of $7.8 mil-
lion,152 but this took over three years, and if the SEC had not frozen the 
funds from the insider trading transactions, the profits from this illegal 
activity would probably have been long dissipated. As this case demon-
strates, although the SEC can use mutual assistance treaties for the pro-
duction of information, the coverage of the agreements is limited, and the 
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2348, at *1–2 (June 9, 1986). 
 147. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25, 1977, 20 U.S.T. 2019. 
 148. JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 732 (2d 
ed. 2005). 
 149. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, 81 Civ. 6553 (WCC), 1983 WL 1343 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 150. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, Litigation Release No. 11,012, 1986 WL 
70986, at *1 (Feb. 26, 1986). 
 151. Id. at *2. 
 152. In addition to the $6.2 million in profits made by the “unknown purchasers,” a 
Santa Fe director and his business associate also traded on the stock in violation of insid-
er trading laws, realizing profits in excess of $3.5 million. Id. at *1–2. 
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procedures that must be followed are cumbersome and entail lengthy 
negotiations. Further, generally there must be dual criminality. Until 
1988, insider trading was not criminal in Switzerland, and the absence of 
dual criminality hampered SEC investigations.153 
The SEC set out to solve its problems in obtaining evidence of illegal 
behavior from foreign regulators by negotiating MOUs. MOUs are 
statements of cooperative intent, not legally binding obligations.154 They 
do not override domestic law or preclude other avenues for obtaining 
evidence abroad.155 The first MOU that the SEC negotiated was with 
Switzerland in 1982.156 Since insider trading was not then illegal, the 
MOU stated that the parties would rely on a private agreement between 
the SEC and the Swiss Bankers Association until the Swiss legislature 
criminalized insider trading.157 The MOU between the SEC and Switzer-
land was followed by numerous negotiated MOUs between the SEC and 
foreign regulators. MOUs formalize methods of requesting and providing 
information between like-minded regulators. The Swiss MOU was li-
mited, however, in that it allowed private parties to challenge SEC re-
quests and restricted the SEC’s use of information provided. In the next 
few years, the SEC negotiated MOUs with the U.K. Department of Trade 
and Industry, the Japanese Ministry of Finance, and the Brazilian Securi-
ties Commission.158 Also, in 1989, the SEC created the Office of Interna-
tional Affairs, reporting directly to the Chairman, specifically to nego-
tiate MOUs.159 
Seeking a more global solution to the problems of gathering evidence 
in foreign countries, the SEC sought and received assistance from 
IOSCO. In November 1986, an IOSCO resolution called on all securities 
authorities, to the extent permitted by law, to provide assistance on a re-
                                                                                                                       
 153. See Daniel L. Goelzer, Anne Sullivan & Robert Mills, Securities Regulation in 
the International Marketplace: Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements, 9 MICH. Y.B. 
INT’L STUD. 53, 83–84 (1988). 
 154. See DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, CONSENT AND COMMITMENT IN THE WORLD 
COMMUNITY: THE CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 38 
(1997). 
 155. MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW: A CONTEMPORARY AND 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 205 (1999). 
 156. See id. at 218. 
 157. Id. The mechanism for such cooperation was that a private group of Swiss bank-
ers required their customers to waive Swiss bank secrecy as a condition to conducting 
U.S. securities transactions. Goelzer et al., supra note 153, at 87. See also Jonathan R. 
Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition, 52 EMORY 
L.J. 1353, 1368 (2003) (noting that the Swiss eventually criminalized insider trading in 
1988). 
 158. H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 7 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888. 
 159. Office of International Affairs Established, SEC NEWS DIG., Dec. 19, 1989, at 1. 
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ciprocal basis for obtaining information relating to market oversight and 
protection of markets against fraud.160 When questions arose as to the 
SEC’s authority to collect evidence for foreign regulators, Congress 
passed the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 
1990161 to confirm the SEC’s authority to enter into MOUs and to gather 
evidence for foreign regulators. In addition, the statute created a confi-
dentiality exception from the Freedom of Information Act for evidence 
that the SEC obtains from foreign regulators.162 
In 2002, IOSCO created a Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
(“MMOU”) for enforcement cooperation among securities regulators. 
The SEC was an initial signatory to the agreement, and by December 
2007, there were forty-three securities and derivatives regulators that 
were signatories.163 Before the IOSCO MMOU came into existence, the 
SEC had signed bilateral information-sharing MOUs with the securities 
authorities of twenty different countries, and in 2007, the SEC made 556 
requests to foreign regulators for assistance and responded to 454 re-
quests.164 Yet, the IOSCO MMOU is neither a treaty nor an international 
agreement, and it specifically states that its provisions “are not intended 
to create legally binding obligations or supersede domestic laws.”165 
The globalization of the securities markets has created the need for the 
sharing of information and cooperation among securities regulators 
beyond the sharing of evidence in a particular enforcement investigation. 
Demutualization of securities exchanges and their search for cross-border 
merger partners have raised questions about how these new multinational 
markets should be regulated.166 In 2007, the SEC approved the combina-
                                                                                                                       
 160. Michael D. Mann & William P. Barry, Developments in the Internationalization 
of Securities Enforcement, 39 INT’L LAW. 667, 673 n.23 (2005). 
 161. International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-550, 
104 Stat. 2714 (1990). 
 162. 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d) (1934). 
 163. List of Signatories to the IOSCO MMOU, http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm? 
section=mou_siglist (last visited Mar. 14, 2009). See Office of International Affairs Out-
line, in The SEC Speaks in 2008, at 1181, 1200–01 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course, 
Handbook Series No. 13966, 2008) [hereinafter SEC Speaks in 2008]. 
 164.  SEC Speaks in 2008, supra note 163, at 1201–02. 
 165. Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Coop-
eration and the Exchange of Information, IOSCO, May 2002, ¶ 6(a), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/iosco.pdf. Indeed, adherence to MOU 
protocols cannot override U.S. constitutional protections of persons under government 
investigation. See Elliott M. Beard, A Critical Analysis of the Effects of Collelo v. SEC on 
International Securities Law Enforcement Agreements, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 271 
(1996). 
 166. See Amir N. Licht, Stock Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and the 
Privatization of Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 583 (2001). 
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tion of the NYSE Group, Inc., the publicly traded parent of the New 
York Stock Exchange, and Euronext N.V., a Netherlands company that 
owns five European stock exchanges. The SEC then entered into an 
MOU with the College of Euronext Regulators, a consortium of five Eu-
ropean national authorities, that provides a framework for coordination, 
consultation, cooperation, and exchange of information in connection 
with the oversight of NYSE Euronext and its markets.167 Yet, the absence 
of a global securities regulator, conflicting securities regulation on mar-
ket structure by the SEC and the European Union,168 and political and 
economic tensions between the United States and the European Union 
make the future of such voluntary regulatory cooperation uncertain.169 
MOUs, like IFRS, are soft law responses to the regulatory challenges 
of the global securities markets. Neither the SEC, nor any other securities 
regulator, has the economic or political clout to impose its standards on 
the rest of the world. However, financial intermediaries and capital mar-
kets are no longer national, and if they can no longer be regulated by a 
single national regulator, they will not be effectively regulated unless 
securities authorities cooperate and agree upon common standards. The 
need for regulators to remain relevant and to exercise authority over fast-
moving global markets and the players in those markets has driven them 
to cooperative, soft law solutions to the challenges posed by multination-
al issuers, investors, and traders. Whether these soft law solutions will 
stand up in times of economic crisis and market stress remains to be 
seen. 
National hard law solutions may well conflict because of differing cor-
porate finance systems, and the only international body with a worldwide 
constituency in the general securities regulatory field is IOSCO, which is 
a voluntary organization. IOSCO, and more specialized bodies like the 
IASB, can discuss problems in the capital markets and possible solutions 
to those problems, and often obtain a consensus for international securi-
ties law standards, but IOSCO has no authority to compel any member 
commission to implement or enforce such standards. Whether IOSCO 
standards are even international law could probably be debated, but they 
are the best international law norms that exist in this field. 
                                                                                                                       
 167. SEC Speaks in 2008, supra note 163, at 1194–95. 
 168. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The 
Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355, 367–79 (2007). 
 169. See Sara M. Saylor, Note, Are Securities Regulators Prepared for a Truly Trans-
national Exchange?, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 685 (2008). 
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C. Anti-bribery 
Over a period of thirty years, international anti-bribery norms evolved 
from national hard law, to soft law, to international treaty law in the form 
of the 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in 
International Business Transactions (“OECD Anti-Bribery Convention” 
or “Convention”). This evolution was prodded by the United States, 
which saw combating bribery of foreign officials by its own business 
people (and those from other nations) in its normative and rationalistic 
interests. The strategic use of soft law instruments as well as diplomatic 
and public pressure made the commitment to a hard law instrument polit-
ically attainable. 
In 1977, the United States enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”)170 in response to evidence of widespread illegal payments to 
government officials by large U.S. companies.171 Some of these scandals 
not only were morally repugnant, but also implicated U.S. foreign policy 
interests because foreign governments were threatened by the news that 
their officials had been bribed by U.S. businesses.172 In response, the 
United States enacted the FCPA, which criminalized the bribing of any 
foreign official by any U.S. issuers or domestic concerns.173 
Initially, the United States believed that other countries would follow 
suit and enact similar legislation.174 That did not happen. Instead, U.S. 
companies faced a disadvantage trying to do business overseas and com-
peting with companies whose national laws did not govern bribery of 
                                                                                                                       
 170. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 & 2, 78ff (2008). 
 171. Following the Watergate scandal, U.S. government investigations revealed that 
U.S. businesses had used foreign ties to launder illegal financial contributions to Presi-
dent Nixon’s campaign, prompting the SEC to launch parallel investigations into other 
corporate practices. The SEC uncovered similar corrupt actions, most notably Lockheed’s 
bribery of Japanese, Dutch, and Italian officials. During the course of the SEC investiga-
tions, over $300 million in bribes to foreign public officials was uncovered, with almost 
half of the 400 U.S. companies involved ranking in the Fortune 500. Peter W. Schroth, 
The United States and the International Bribery Conventions, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 
593, 593–96 (2002). The moral upheaval that resulted in the United States created a ge-
nuine political issue to which legislators responded by enacting the FCPA. Id. at 596–97. 
 172. S. REP. NO. 114, at 3–4 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101–
02. 
 173. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1)(B), 78dd-2(a)(1)(B). Following the completion of 
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, a provision was added to the FCPA in 1998, which 
made it unlawful for “any person other than an issuer . . . or a domestic concern” to bribe 
a foreign official. Id. § 78dd-3. 
 174.  Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Lega-
lization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141, S162 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Abbott & Snidal, Values and Interests]. 
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foreign officials.175 Some of these countries viewed bribery as part of a 
developing country’s economy and saw no moral or economic reason to 
stop it.176 Indeed, even the World Bank failed to condemn corruption.177 
At first, efforts to develop soft law principles condemning corruption 
failed to produce meaningful commitments. In tracking the development 
of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Professors Abbott and Snidal 
note the efforts of many international organizations, including “the 
[U.N.], the development banks, the [IMF], the [OAS], the Council of 
Europe, the European Union . . . and of course the OECD . . . [, which] 
adopted anticorruption policies, though their enthusiasm and effective-
ness varied widely.”178 For example, the OAS first unanimously resolved 
in 1975 “to cooperate in the exchange of information” and to “prepare[] a 
draft code of conduct,”179 and asked that members “clarify their national 
laws” accordingly.180 There was, however, no provision detailing any 
means by which to enforce the statements made in the resolution.181 The 
OAS then ceased to address the problem again until the 1994 Summit of 
the Americas, where it called for multilateral efforts to combat corrup-
tion.182 
                                                                                                                       
 175.  Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 345, 364–65 (2000) (stating that although the U.S.-led investigations 
revealed widespread bribery abroad, no other countries addressed the problem); id. at 359 
(noting that since enacting the FCPA, Congress has amended it twice in an “effort to 
strengthen the global competitiveness of American businesses”). 
 176. Christopher F. Corr & Judd Lawler, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t?: 
The OECD Convention and the Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures, 32 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1249, 1253 (discussing that in developing countries bribery was seen as a 
“necessary evil”); Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing 
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 665, 673–74 (2004) (noting that 
many countries did not see corruption and bribery as immoral or “bad,” but rather as 
necessary to economic and political progress in developing countries). 
 177. Posadas, supra note 175, at 399–400 (discussing that the World Bank and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund only began taking steps towards combating corruption in the latter 
half of the 1990s). 
 178. Abbott & Snidal, Values and Interests, supra note 174, at S159–60. 
 179. Organization of American States [OAS], Resolution on the Behavior of Transna-
tional Enterprises, ¶¶ 1–2, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. G, CP/RES. 154 (167/75) (July 10, 
1975). 
 180. OAS, Resolution on the Behavior of Transnational Enterprises, supra note 179, ¶ 
II. 
 181. See OAS, Resolution on the Behavior of Transnational Enterprises, supra note 
179. The resolution declared that the Permanent Council should consult experts and de-
vise “appropriate procedures” in developing a code of conduct, but that any resulting 
information would only be “placed on the agenda . . . for consideration.” Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
 182. Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11, 
1995, 34 I.L.M. 808, 811 (1995). 
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Other organizations dabbled in anticorruption norms in the 1970s as 
well. In 1977, the International Chamber of Commerce’s Commission on 
Ethical Practices promulgated a set of recommendations for governments 
and rules of conduct for corporations and their employees.183 The rec-
ommendations urged countries to negotiate a multilateral treaty and to 
implement their own domestic legislation.184 The Rules of Conduct to 
Combat Extortion and Bribery provided a self-regulatory framework for 
corporations to adopt if they so chose.185 Also in the 1970s, the U.N. 
acted through Resolution 3514 in condemning bribery and urging gov-
ernments to legislate accordingly.186 These efforts lacked follow-up. 
Finally, in 1993, the OECD, at the behest of the United States, tackled 
the problem of bribery.187 In some ways the OECD was a perfect soft law 
venue.188 It provided a forum for policy discussion and persuasion.189 As 
a club organization with a limited number of members, it was conducive 
to consensus.190 It established a Working Group on Bribery in Interna-
                                                                                                                       
 183. Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Extortion and Bribery in Business Transac-
tions, Nov. 29, 1977, Publ’n No. 315, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 417, 418–21 (1978). 
 184. ICC, Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, supra note 183, at 418. 
 185. Id. at 419. 
 186. G.A. Res. 3514 (XXX), ¶¶ 1–5, U.N. Doc. A/10467 (Dec. 15, 1975). Even after 
the U.N. issued this resolution and bribery scandals in Japan and Iran emerged, U.S. ef-
forts to garner consensus on a mandatory international corporate code of conduct were 
met with “deafening silence.” Seymour Rubin, International Aspects of the Control of 
Illicit Payments, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 315, 318–20 (1982). These attempts were 
apparently doomed from the start as previously the United States had “firmly insisted that 
the codes of conduct [for other aspects of transnational corporations] be voluntary,” and 
this inconsistent stance seemed to block further U.N. cooperation. Id. at 321. 
 187. Schroth, supra note 171, at 610–11 (discussing that Congress had pressed for 
action within the OECD, but that it was not vigorously pursued until 1993, after which 
the OECD ultimately issued a Recommendation against bribery in 1994). 
 188. Abbott and Snidal track the OECD efforts to illustrate the interplay of rationalist 
and constructivists accounts of international norm development. Abbott & Snidal, Values 
and Interests, supra note 174, at S143–44. 
 189. See THE OECD, supra note 105, at 7 (describing the advantages of the OECD 
forum in discussing issues and persuading other actors to change their policies). 
 190. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Between Centralization and Fragmenta-
tion: The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legiti-
macy, Kennedy School of Government Working Paper Series, RWP01-004 at 4, (2001) 
available at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP01-004/$File/rw 
p01_004_nye_rev1.pdf (discussing that the club model fosters “close working relation-
ships” between negotiators within an issue-area and reports only a finished product, thus 
eliminating interference from outsiders and domestic politics). See also Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extrater-
ritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 5, 32 (2003) (“The OECD is 
the preferred forum for coordinating action when extraterritoriality with reciprocity is the 
preferred approach.”); Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, 
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tional Business Transactions, which included member nations as well as 
members of civil society, including Transparency International, other 
international organizations such as the World Bank, and prosecutors 
from the United States and Europe.191 In accordance with the Council’s 
statement condemning bribery, the Working Group issued a recommen-
dation that member countries also abolish the tax deductibility of 
bribes.192 As Abbott and Snidal discuss, these instruments were intended 
to be soft law instruments that would work towards moving public opi-
nion to pressure governments to attack the problem more forcefully.193 
Over time, attitudes concerning the effect of bribery on developing na-
tions changed, partly due to public opinion and partly in response to U.S. 
pressure.194 Between 1993 and 1997, the OECD used soft law instru-
ments to move its members towards a firm commitment against bribery 
in international business transactions.195 
                                                                                                                       
The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Towards 
Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 487 (2000) (identifying the 
OECD as “the club”). 
 191. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Recommendation on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions, ¶ VIII, OECD Doc. C(94)75/FINAL (May 27, 
1994) (instructing the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises to create the Working Group); Abbott & Snidal, Values and Interests, supra note 
174, at S166–67 (discussing the various “value activists” that were included in the 
OECD’s Working Group); OECD, Working Group on Bribery in International Business 
Transactions, http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3343,en_2649_34855_35430021_1_1_ 
1_1,00.html (last visited June 18, 2008) (describing the establishment and mandate of the 
Working Group). 
 192. OECD, Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public 
Officials, OECD Doc. C(96)27/FINAL (Apr. 17, 1996). 
 193. In pursuing its anticorruption agenda in the OECD, the U.S. State Department 
relied on the emerging public interest in combating corruption in Europe and the bad 
press generated by European scandals. Abbott & Snidal, Values and Interests, supra note 
174, at S164–65. 
 194. See Tarullo, supra note 176, at 678–80 (discussing U.S. attempts to persuade 
other governments to alter their policies on bribery and to address public concern with 
domestic scandals and their effects on democratization). 
 195. Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lesson from the Case of Bribery 
and Corruption, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 275, 289–90 (2001). At the same time, other soft law 
efforts to combat corruption proceeded. The OAS efforts picked up again. In a 1992 Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution, the OAS declared that corruption had a negative effect on 
development, and in 1996 it adopted an anticorruption agreement, the Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption (“IACAC”). See OAS, Corrupt International Trade 
Practices, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 1159(XXII–092) (May 22, 1992), available at http://www. 
oas.org/juridico/english/ga-res97/eres1159.htm; IACAC, supra note 53. The IACAC 
lacked monitoring and compliance mechanisms and instructed States to “consider” cer-
tain preventative measures and to take steps to establish transnational bribery and illicit 
enrichment as offenses under each country’s national law. IACAC, supra note 53, art. III 
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The end game for anti-bribery efforts was a hard law convention—soft 
law was the means to the end. Admittedly, U.S. negotiators thought that 
obtaining a hard law instrument was not a realistic short-term goal.196 
But, an international hard law commitment was needed to combat the 
prisoner’s dilemma faced by nations.197 If any one nation prohibited bri-
bery of foreign officials by its business people, it lost out to a greater ex-
tent than if it allowed bribery to continue.198 Forcing all nations to prohi-
bit bribery maximized gains for all.199 Initially, negotiators focused on 
persuasion, and their partners in civil society, namely Transparency In-
ternational, championed the effectiveness of public opinion as a soft law 
tool to pressure governments and move them towards the hard law com-
mitment.200 
The process took time and prodding. The OECD first recognized bri-
bery as a problem in its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(“Guidelines”) as part of the Declarations and Decisions on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises in 1976.201 But until U.S. pres-
                                                                                                                       
(“States Parties agree to consider the applicability of measures within their own institu-
tional systems”); id. art. VIII (discussing transnational bribery); id. art. IX (discussing 
illicit enrichment). Thus, while the IACAC was a treaty, its proscriptions fell short of 
hard law. See Mark E. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the 
American Multinational Enterprise, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 89, 128–29 (2001) (noting that the 
IACAC’s potential effectiveness is undermined by its loose terms). After recognizing the 
necessity of a compliance monitoring system, the OAS General Assembly passed a reso-
lution in 2001 adopting a follow-up mechanism to the IACAC. OAS, Mechanism for 
Follow-up of Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 
OAS Doc. AG/RES. 1784 (XXXI-O/01) (June 5, 2001), available at http://www.oas.org/ 
juridico/english/ga01/agres1784.htm. 
 196. Posadas, supra note 175, at 376–77 (stating that although the State Department at 
first wanted to pursue a binding agreement, it later realized that insistence upon hard law 
could prove counterproductive). 
 197. See Tarullo, supra note 176, at 675 (stating that the United States in particular 
sought a binding agreement that would enforce anti-bribery laws and impose sanctions in 
order to equalize the playing field and induce cooperation between U.S. and foreign cor-
porations). 
 198. Id. at 670 (discussing the positive outcomes for companies permitted to bribe 
officials in obtaining contracts, while nonbribers receive no payoff at all); id. at 674–75 
(identifying the advantage created by the FCPA for non-U.S. corporations once their U.S. 
counterparts had become committed cooperators). 
 199. Id. at 694 (stating that so long as the nature of the commitment offered assurances 
that made compliance more attractive than noncompliance, countries would benefit from 
mutual enforcement). 
 200. Abbott & Snidal, Values and Interests, supra note 174, at S165 (noting Transpa-
rency International’s strong belief in “normative persuasion”). 
 201. See OECD Declarations and Decisions on International Investment and Multina-
tional Enterprises, http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,en_2649_34889_1875736_1_ 
1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). The most recent revisions of the Guidelines 
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sure in the 1990s, anti-bribery efforts—even soft law efforts—were at a 
standstill.202 A 1994 recommendation of the OECD Council referenced 
the Guidelines and instructed the corresponding committee to form the 
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions.203 It 
also recommended both domestic legislation and international coopera-
tion (through existing agreements and the formation of new ones) to pro-
hibit bribery.204 In 1996, the OECD issued another recommendation that 
further encouraged member countries to eliminate tax deductibility in 
connection with bribery of foreign public officials.205 At the same time, 
the United States was applying pressure amongst its allies and capitaliz-
ing on public attitudes towards corruption.206 The OECD issued a final 
recommendation regarding bribery on May 23, 1997 (“Final Recommen-
dation”).207 The Final Recommendation included a list of “Agreed Com-
mon Elements” and opened the negotiations for the eventual Anti-
Bribery Convention.208 Ambitiously, the Final Recommendation discussed 
criminalization, tax deductibility, public procurement, international co-
operation, arrangements for a monitoring system, cooperation with non-
OECD members, and cooperation with intergovernmental organizations 
(“IGOs”) and nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”).209 These efforts 
to change the values of the public and governments bore fruit. By 1997, 
attitudes concerning the appropriateness of bribery and its effect on in-
ternational business had changed significantly.210 
                                                                                                                       
occurred in 2000, and contain a section on Combating Bribery, which instructs multina-
tional enterprises not to “directly or indirectly” offer bribes and, likewise, that bribes 
should not be solicited from them. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GUIDELINES 
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 24–25, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/ 
36/1922428.pdf. 
 202. See supra note 186, and accompanying text. 
 203. OECD, Recommendation on Bribery in International Business Transactions, 
supra note 191, ¶ VIII. 
 204. Id. ¶ IV. 
 205. OECD, Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public 
Officials, supra note 192. 
 206. See supra notes 187–95 and accompanying text. 
 207. OECD, Revised Recommendation C(97)123/Final on Combating Bribery in In-
ternational Business Transactions, OECD Doc. C(97)123/FINAL (May 23, 1997) [here-
inafter OECD, Revised Recommendation]. 
 208. Id. annex (“Agreed Common Elements of Criminal Legislation and Related Ac-
tion”). The Council stated that the ultimate Anti-Bribery Convention was to be completed 
by the end of the year, and that it should ideally enter into force one year after that. Id. ¶ 
III. 
 209. Id. ¶¶ III–XIII. 
 210. Posadas, supra note 175, at 380. NGOs also began to get involved in the process, 
and Transparency International was an integral part of the negotiations that led to the 
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After accepting several soft law instruments, OECD members found it 
easier to accept (or more difficult to resist) a hard law instrument.211 The 
Final Recommendation moved the members to the point where they had 
agreed to a list of common elements for anti-bribery legislation.212 Once 
these elements had been agreed upon, the task of negotiating a hard law 
treaty became much easier.213 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was 
the result.214 It is a legally binding hard law instrument that incorporates 
the common elements of bribery and requires signatories to implement 
domestic legislation consistent with the Convention.215 While it does not 
mandate a particular format for that legislation, it does provide for a 
monitoring system of peer review to ensure that legislation exists and 
that it is enforced.216 
Although negotiators reached their hard law goal, the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention still faces criticisms. It only addresses bribery and 
not other forms of corruption.217 And individual States still define bribery 
                                                                                                                       
OECD Recommendations and Convention. Corr & Lawler, supra note 176, at 1299–303. 
The group also currently assists OECD countries in implementing, enforcing, and moni-
toring compliance with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, as well as other similar 
conventions. Transparency International: Projects and Conventions, http://www.transparency. 
org/global_priorities/international_conventions/projects_conventions (last visited Jan. 25, 
2009). 
 211. The European countries submitted their own draft of the proposed Convention, 
which was rejected. Specifically, the United States suspected that the push for a legally 
binding document was an “obstructionist tactic.” Abbott and Snidal note, however, that 
once these European countries were “on record” as supporting hard law, it became more 
difficult for them to back out of negotiations. Abbott & Snidal, Values and Interests, 
supra note 174, at S167–68. 
 212. The common elements included definitions, sanctions, and enforcement provi-
sions. Emphasis was placed on international cooperation. Specifically, members were 
supposed to make efforts to eliminate the delaying effects of dual criminality constraints 
and to facilitate information sharing between governments. OECD, Revised Recommen-
dation, supra note 207, annex. 
 213. Abbott & Snidal, Values and Interests, supra note 174, at S168. 
 214. There are now thirty-seven signatories. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: 
Entry into Force of the Convention, http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_ 
34859_2057484_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2009). 
 215. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions pmbl., Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998), available at 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT00000B7E/$FILE/04E81240.PDF [he-
reinafter Anti-Bribery Convention] (referencing the agreed common elements as set forth 
in the OECD’s Final Recommendation of 1997); id. arts. 1–3 (requiring Parties to estab-
lish bribery as a criminal offense, to establish liability for bribery of foreign public offi-
cials, and to make the offence punishable within their respective domestic legal systems). 
 216. Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 216, art. 12. 
 217. Id. pmbl. See also Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis 
of International Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
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pursuant to their own national laws.218 Broader provisions targeting pay-
ments to political candidates are noticeably absent,219 and commentators 
have noted that despite the monitoring provisions, the Convention still 
has serious enforcement problems.220 
What is remarkable about the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
though, is that it exists at all, especially in light of the fact the U.S. FCPA 
lessened any incentive for other governments to agree to such a conven-
tion. As Daniel Tarullo has discussed, basic game theory illustrates that 
once the United States enacted the FCPA, it became a winning proposi-
tion for other countries to resist any anti-bribery legislation.221 The pros-
pect of having countries commit to international hard law mandating 
such legislation seemed dim.222 Soft law brightened those possibilities. 
As Professors Abbott and Snidal have explained in their work, soft law 
allowed normative influences to transform rationalist ones.223 In other 
words, while it may not have been in most countries’ rationalistic inter-
ests to commit to anti-bribery legislation, soft law persuaded them to 
                                                                                                                       
COMP. L. 793, 862–63 (2003) (discussing that the Convention focuses on bribery as “the 
primary harm from corruption”). 
 218. Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 216, cmt. 3. While the Anti-Bribery Con-
vention may “promote” uniformity, the Commentaries following the official text state 
that the goal of the Convention is “to assure a functional equivalence among the measures 
taken by the Parties . . . without requiring uniformity or changes in fundamental prin-
ciples of a Party’s legal system.” Id. cmt. 2. 
 219. The FCPA’s prohibition on bribery includes conveying anything of value to “any 
foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office.” 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(2), 78dd-2(a)(2) (2008). The Anti-Bribery Convention leaves this 
language out of its definition of “foreign public officials.” Anti-Bribery Convention, 
supra note 216, art. 1. Additionally, the Commentaries indicate that although “there is a 
commonly shared concern and intent to address this phenomenon through further work,” 
it is not covered by the Convention. Id. cmt. 10. 
 220. Tarullo, supra note 176, at 682–83 (noting the difficulties in enforcing the Con-
vention’s requirements through the mechanism of peer review). The primary difficulty in 
relying on individual members, rather than an overseeing body, is that bribery tends to be 
the sort of offense that is not readily reported to government officials. Thus, there is no 
guarantee that these offenses will be investigated and prosecuted. Id. Furthermore, “the 
path of the domestic law enforcement system” is troublesome because many of the mem-
bers’ legal systems are insufficiently organized to allow for investigations overseas, 
which causes indifference towards ensuring compliance. Id. at 688. Taken together, these 
issues create an “insufficiency of the ‘compliance pull’” and States feel less obligated to 
ensure compliance with the Convention. Id. at 687. 
 221. Id. at 672–74. 
 222. Id. at 674. 
 223. Abbott & Snidal, Values and Interests, supra note 174, at S143–44, S163 (dis-
cussing that the use of soft law as a vehicle to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention high-
lights the effectiveness of the value tactics utilized by the United States to influence in-
terest-based concerns). 
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change their interests.224 The calculus that followed allowed for a hard 
law commitment. 
Although soft law was a tool in changing that calculus, it was not the 
only tool. It is clear that the OECD’s employment of soft law came at the 
behest of the United States and that the United States was able to exer-
cise its moral and diplomatic influence to spur soft law development 
beyond the fits and starts that occurred in the 1970s. The persistent use of 
soft law made the transformation politically attainable. 
D. Credit Rating Agencies 
Intense focus on the role and appropriate regulation of CRAs has been 
ongoing in the United States and abroad since at least the collapse of 
Enron. Until four days before Enron declared bankruptcy, major CRAs 
continued to rate its debt as “investment grade.”225 Similarly, WorldCom 
was rated investment grade three months before filing for bankruptcy, 
and Global Crossing was rated investment grade in March 2002 and de-
faulted on loans in July 2002.226 Such failures to downgrade the debt of 
failing companies have not been limited to U.S. issuers.227 Further, the 
rating agencies did not anticipate the 1997–1998 Asian debt crisis, which 
adversely impacted sovereign debt issues.228 More recently, criticism of 
the conduct and competence of CRAs has focused on the huge number of 
rating agencies’ write downs of previously highly rated residential mort-
gage-backed securities (“RMBS”) and collateralized debt obligations 
(“CDOs”) in the context of the subprime mortgage crisis.229 
CRAs analyze and evaluate the creditworthiness of corporate and sove-
reign issuers of debt securities. While CRA ratings are often thought to 
represent a judgment on the worthiness of an investment because of the 
use of the term “investment grade” to refer to highly rated securities, the 
opinions of CRAs relate solely to the likelihood that a particular debt 
                                                                                                                       
 224. Id. at S164–68 (discussing European incentives to support bribery, the value 
transformation that occurred during the OECD negotiations, and the relatively smooth 
evolution from the “soft law” Recommendations to the Anti-Bribery Convention). 
 225. Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004). 
 226. Statement of Egan Jones on Credit Rating Agencies, Nov. 15, 2002 Hearing on 
Credit Rating Agencies, www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/eganjones2.htm (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2009). 
 227. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Credit Rating Agencies and 
Their Potential Impact on Developing Countries, UNCTAD Discussion Paper 18, at 2, 
UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2008/1 (Jan. 2008) (prepared by Marwan Elkhoury) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD Elkhoury Discussion Paper]. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 
Exchange Act Release No. 57,967, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212, at 36,216–18 (June 25, 2008). 
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security will perform according to its terms. A high credit rating does not 
purport to be an opinion that the debt instrument is a good investment.230 
Nevertheless, as a surrogate for the riskiness of investments held by re-
gulated entities, specific references to credit ratings in the rules of the 
SEC and Basel II have given such ratings significance and credibility as 
a measure of the creditworthiness of issuers.231 In 1975, the SEC adopted 
the term “nationally recognized statistical rating organization” 
(“NRSRO”) to determine capital charges for broker-dealers for purposes 
of the SEC’s capital adequacy or net capital rule.232 Marketplace and 
regulatory reliance on credit ratings then gradually increased, and the 
concept of an NRSRO became embedded in a wide range of U.S. regula-
tions of financial institutions, as well as state, federal, and foreign laws 
relating to creditworthiness.233 The failure of the CRAs to promptly ad-
just ratings or forecast the demise of issuers that went bankrupt when the 
stock market technology bubble burst then led to scrutiny of their per-
formance and the lack of government regulation. 
The SEC never passed a rule defining NRSROs, but rather, recognized 
agencies as such through a no-action letter process. The SEC staff consi-
dered a number of factors, the most important of which was that the 
agency was “nationally recognized” for ratings reliability.234 This opaque 
process and the highly concentrated number of NRSROs led to criticism 
of the SEC’s procedures, and in 1997 the SEC proposed codifying its 
NRSRO criteria and giving rejected organizations a right to appeal denial 
of the designation.235 This proposal was not acted upon, however. 
Government regulation of CRAs in the United States was controversial 
and remains so. Some believe that the NRSRO designation is a barrier to 
competition in the credit rating business.236 Others have argued that the 
                                                                                                                       
 230. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, TECHNICAL COMM., THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING 
AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS, at n.8 (Mar. 2008) [hereinafter IOSCO, 
CRA REPORT]. 
 231. See UNCTAD Elkhoury Discussion Paper, supra note 227, at 1; SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE 
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 5 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf [hereinafter SARBANES-OXLEY REPORT]. 
 232. SARBANES-OXLEY REPORT, supra note 231, at 6. 
 233. Id. at 7–8. 
 234. Hill, supra note 225, at 55. Other factors taken into consideration were organiza-
tional structure; size and experience of staff; the agency’s independence from the compa-
ny it rates; and internal procedures to prevent misuse of inside information. Id. at 55–56. 
 235. Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 39,457, 66 SEC Docket 254 (Dec. 17, 1997). 
 236. E.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agen-
cy Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 20 (2002) (noting that the NRSRO designation blocks 
competition among rating agencies because it limits the number of agencies). 
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SEC lacks authority to substantively regulate CRAs237 and that such au-
thority would be inappropriate because the activities of CRAs are journa-
listic and protected by the First Amendment.238 Yet, shortcomings by 
CRAs raised questions as to whether their lack of regulation and the 
SEC’s process for designating NRSROs were appropriate. Accordingly, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandated that the SEC study the role and func-
tion of CRAs and submit a report to Congress.239 This study was required 
to cover the following areas: the role of CRAs in evaluating issuers; the 
importance of that role to investors and the markets; impediments to ac-
curate appraisals of the financial resources and risks of securities issuers; 
barriers to entry to the CRA business; measures to improve dissemina-
tion of CRA appraisals; and conflicts of interest in rating operations. The 
SEC issued this required report, but did not draw any firm conclusions 
concerning how, if at all, CRAs should be regulated. Instead, the SEC 
stated that it intended to issue a Concept Release covering the following 
issues: mandating disclosure by NRSROs about the ratings process and 
other matters; conflicts of interest; anticompetitive or unfair practices; 
reducing barriers to entry; and ongoing SEC oversight of CRAs.240 This 
Concept Release was duly issued in June 2003.241 
In the meantime, the Technical Committee of IOSCO formed a task 
force to study issues relating to CRAs and released a report in September 
2003 describing the role of CRAs in the global capital markets.242 This 
task force was chaired by a commissioner of the U.S. SEC and included 
representatives from Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Italy, Japan, Ontario, Canada, Portugal, Spain, and the United King-
dom.243 At the same time, IOSCO published a set of principles that regu-
lators, CRAs, and other market participants could follow to improve the 
integrity of the ratings process and help ensure that investors are pro-
                                                                                                                       
 237. As will be explained, some authority was given to the SEC in the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 109-291 (2006). 
 238. Concept Release: Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Fed-
eral Securities Law, Exchange Act Release No. 47,972, 68 Fed. Reg. 113, at 4 (June 12, 
2003) [hereinafter Rating Agencies Concept Release]. 
 239. The report was to be filed not less than 180 days after the passage of the Act. 
Sarbanes-Oxley § 702, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002). 
 240. SARBANES-OXLEY REPORT, supra note 231, at 43–45. 
 241. Rating Agencies Concept Release, supra note 238. 
 242. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, TECHNICAL COMM, REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (Sept. 2003), available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ 
IOSCOPD153.pdf. 
 243. Id. at 1 n.3. The three largest international CRAs—Moody’s, S & P, and Fitch—
are all U.S. companies. Id. at 8. 
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vided with timely, high-quality ratings.244 These principles were fairly 
general and related to the quality and integrity of the ratings process, in-
dependence and conflicts of interest, transparency and the timeliness of 
ratings disclosure, and the use of confidential information. 
Responding to suggestions that these principles were insufficient to 
deal with the problems posed by CRAs, particularly in light of the use of 
credit ratings in Basel II, IOSCO continued to analyze how CRAs should 
be regulated. In September 2003, IOSCO issued a report on the activities 
of CRAs, and a Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs.245 The Code 
of Conduct Fundamentals was much more specific than the earlier pub-
lished principles, and especially focused on the quality of the ratings 
process, including updating of opinions, conflicts of interest, employee 
and analyst independence, and transparency. In response, the two largest 
CRAs, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, published their own Code of 
Professional Conduct in the second half of 2005.246 
With IOSCO having paved the way for regulation of CRAs, Congress 
passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (“CRA Reform Act”) in 
2006, which established a system of registration and regulation of 
NRSROs and instructed the SEC to formulate implementing rules.247 The 
CRA Reform Act effected three changes in the SEC’s regulation of 
NRSROs. First, it added definitions of “credit rating,” “credit rating 
agency,” “nationally recognized statistical rating organization,” and 
“person associated” with an NRSRO.248 Second, it replaced the SEC’s 
no-action letter procedure for recognizing NRSROs with a registration 
procedure, and also imposed substantive requirements on NRSROs with 
respect to misuse of nonpublic information, conflicts of interest, and an-
ticompetitive or abusive conduct.249 Third, it amended the Exchange Act 
to include NRSROs among the types of entities subject to SEC record-
keeping and reporting requirements.250 
                                                                                                                       
 244. IOSCO Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agen-
cies (Sept. 2003), available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD151.pdf. 
 245. IOSCO, CRA REPORT, supra note 230; ANNEX A, CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDA-
MENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (Dec. 2004, revised Feb. 2008), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD263.pdf. 
 246. UNCTAD Elkhoury Discussion Paper, supra note 227, at 12 
 247. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 
(2006) (implementing SEC rules issued in June 2007). 
 248. Exchange Act § 3(a)(61)–(63). 
 249. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 § 4 (codified at Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 § 15G, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7 (2009)). 
 250. Id. § 5 (codified at Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 
78q(a)(1)). 
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In June 2007, the SEC passed rules implementing the CRA Reform 
Act. These rules set forth basic registration requirements for NRSROs 
and obligations to update registration forms.251 Further rules subject 
NRSROs to recordkeeping and annual financial reporting rules,252 and 
require NRSROs to establish procedures to prevent the misuse of confi-
dential information and to manage conflicts of interest.253 Finally, 
NRSROs are prohibited from certain anticompetitive or abusive practices 
relating to tying the issuance or level of a credit rating to an issuer’s pur-
chase of services or products in addition to the credit rating.254 
IOSCO continued to work on the problems posed by CRAs and in 
March 2008, issued a Consultation Report on the role of CRAs in struc-
tured finance markets, as well as a new Code of Professional Conduct.255 
This new code did not recommend any sweeping overhaul, and Charles 
McCreevy, the European financial commissioner, called it “toothless” 
and has been pushing for EU regulation of CRAs. It is unclear what form 
any such EU regulation would take, but it could involve registration of 
CRAs with CESR, or the creation of a European rating agency to break 
the dominance of the big U.S. firms.256 On December 3, 2009 the SEC 
adopted new rules aimed at the conflicts of interest at CRAs. These 
amendments impose additional disclosure requirements on CRAs with 
respect to verification of structured finance assets; assessments of the 
quality of structures finance transaction originators; and surveillance. 
Also, these amendments would add prohibited conflicts to NRSRO 
rules.257 Although these rules were welcomed by some, others criticized 
the rules as not going far enough.258 EU regulators are also continuing to 
propose new regulations for CRAs.259 These rules will regulate conflicts 
of interests, disclosures, internal policies, and business practices of 
CRAs, and as stated by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, reflect the input 
                                                                                                                       
 251. Exchange Act Rule 17g-1, 17 C.F. R. § 240.17g-1 (2007). 
 252. Exchange Act Rules 17g-2, g-3, 17 C.F.R. §§ 17g-2, g-3 (2007). 
 253. Exchange Act Rules 17g-4, g-5, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17g-4, g-5 (2007). 
 254. Exchange Act Rule 17g-6, 17 C.F.R. § 17g-6 (2007). 
 255. IOSCO CONSULTATION REPORT, THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN 
STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS (2008), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/ 
pdf/IOSCOPD270.pdf. 
 256. See Tony Barber, EU Turns Up Heat on Rating Agencies, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 
2008, at 3; Gillian Tett, Unease as Regulators Call for More Control over Ratings Sys-
tem, FIN. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at 25. 
 257. See SEC Press Release Dec. 3, 2008, SEC Approves Measures to Strengthen 
Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies, www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-284.htm. (To 
date, the SEC rules have not been posted on the SEC web site or in the Federal Register.) 
 258.  See S.E.C. Issues Rules on Conflicts in Credit Rating, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008. 
 259. Id. 
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of a number of international regulatory organizations, including the Fi-
nancial Stability Forum and IOSCO.260 Further, the SEC conducted a 
sweeping investigation of CRAs. Its findings have now been made pub-
lic, and it is likely that the SEC will now move forward with enforcement 
actions.261 
While it remains to be seen how the SEC or the European Union, or 
other governmental bodies, will proceed to further regulate CRAs, the 
move from soft law to hard law in this area is interesting because, unlike 
the other stories in this Part of the Article, progress was very quick. Con-
fronted with opposition to government regulation of CRAs, the SEC 
turned to IOSCO to formulate a soft law standard of conduct. But the 
bursting of the technology bubble, and the subprime meltdown and credit 
freeze in the global markets allowed government officials to blame 
CRAs (among others) for these economic debacles and to swiftly pass 
U.S. legislation giving the SEC statutory authority to exercise oversight 
of CRAs, and the SEC has proceeded to pass implementing regulations. 
Quite possibly, the European Union will now move to similarly regulate 
CRAs, although EU regulations could conflict with U.S. regulations, and 
                                                                                                                       
 260. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting on Rules for Credit 
Rating Agencies (June 11, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch06 
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tical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 59,343, 74 Fed. Reg. 6485 (Feb. 9, 
2009). 
 261. Joanne Chung & Michael Mackenzie, SEC Sees Conflicts of Interest at Rating 
Agencies, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at 1. Following investigations, the SEC made public 
its report on credit rating agencies in July 2008. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT 
OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT 
RATING AGENCIES 1 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/cra 
examination070808.pdf. 
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then throw this problem back to IOSCO or some other international body 
to harmonize new regulations. 
III. SOFT LAW CONSEQUENCES 
Soft law has advantages and may be necessary for securities regula-
tion, but it also raises some concerns. First, there is the problem of soft 
law’s legitimacy, which is important because of both normative and in-
strumental concerns. Second, in the United States, the creation of inter-
national soft law and its subsequent hardening arguably occurs outside of 
the constitutional framework for international agreements. We are not 
overly troubled by what we consider largely academic arguments con-
cerning soft law’s constitutionality, given that most soft law instruments 
are not treaties as contemplated by the Constitution, and given the power 
that exists and is exercised in the administrative state by agencies. But 
we are concerned with the fundamental issues of accountability, checks 
against abuses, and transparency that these arguments raise. Still, one 
cannot lose sight of the valuable alternative to regulatory competition 
that soft law offers, namely cooperation. Multiple regulatory venues fos-
ter regulatory competition and the race to the bottom. Commentators dis-
agree over whether such a pattern is detrimental,262 but for those who 
think it is, soft law serves as a valuable framework in the absence of an 
economic hegemon that might persuade or pressure others to avoid the 
race to the bottom. 
A. The Legitimacy Problem 
States, and the people in them, should reasonably be able to expect that 
the laws they live under were legitimately established. At first blush, the 
legitimacy of soft law seems a nonissue. After all, since soft law is non-
                                                                                                                       
 262. Compare Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities 
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 387, 393–96 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, Need for 
Competition] (arguing that regulatory competition is a race to the top because it max-
imizes benefits and corrects policy errors), and Ralph K. Winter, On “Protecting the 
Ordinary Investor,” 63 WASH. L. REV. 881, 901–02 (1988) (favoring competition because 
it maximizes market efficiency), with William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
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ment while harming shareholders, thus creating a race to the bottom). 
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binding,263 a State could simply not adopt or follow it. Since nothing 
compels a State to follow soft law, one may not care whether the norms 
embodied in that soft law are legitimate. But States do follow soft law.264 
States sometimes follow soft law until the point where it hardens.265 
Thus, if we care about the idea that laws should possess some basis for 
compelling behavior, even if the compulsion to follow that norm evolves 
slowly over time, then soft law’s legitimacy matters. 
In addition to normative considerations, legitimacy matters because it 
affects compliance.266 International rules generally secure compliance in 
one (or a combination) of three ways: coercion, self-interest, or legitima-
cy.267 Although coercion may initially seem like the most powerful tool, 
it is not—especially in the international setting.268 Going to war to en-
force a rule is an extraordinary step.269 More likely, States will follow 
rules not because of coercion, but because they will benefit by doing so 
and/or they believe that they should follow the rule because the rule is 
legitimate.270 Thus, a rule’s legitimacy causes a compliance pull;271 
States are drawn to comply in part because they perceive the rule as legi-
timate. 
Legitimacy is also important because it mitigates some of the uncer-
tainties created by soft law. While it can be a valuable tool for policy-
makers, some soft law can leave us without real rules that actually im-
                                                                                                                       
 263. Dinah Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of ‘Soft Law,’ in COMMITMENT 
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 270. See HURD, AFTER ANARCHY, supra note 66, at 37–38 (noting that self-interest and 
legitimacy as means of compliance are preferable to coercion because the latter necessari-
ly “leaves the coerced worse off than before”). 
 271. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24–26 (1990). 
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plement the policies that are needed.272 As José Alvarez points out: 
“[w]hen everything—from ‘guidelines’ to commitments made in loan 
agreements—can be regarded as legally significant, even if not equally 
legally binding, there is understandable fear that law and lawyers will 
lose their value to the policymaker, that if everything is ‘law,’ nothing, in 
the end, will be.”273 Identifying soft law’s legitimacy is thus important, as 
it not only enhances compliance, but also distinguishes it as law in the 
first place. 
Legitimacy can be assessed by means that can be roughly placed in 
two categories, input and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy focuses on 
what goes into the development of norms, while output legitimacy focus-
es on the usefulness of the end product.274 One form of input legitimacy 
is where States consent to be bound to a treaty, for example. Many would 
agree that the rules contained in the treaty are legitimate.275 Where dem-
ocratic States consent to treaties pursuant to nationally accepted proce-
dures, such treaties would appear to be supported by the consent of the 
State as well as its voting citizenry.276 Input legitimacy may also be 
claimed where an international organization allows for the participation 
of those affected by its rules, i.e., representative legitimacy.277 Another 
                                                                                                                       
 272. C. M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in Interna-
tional Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 856–57 (1989) [hereinafter Chinkin, Challenge 
of Soft Law] (noting the purposeful use of soft law to shift state practices and thus alter 
the status of legal principles). See id. at 859 (stating that before soft law can transform 
into hard law, “it must be possible to both determine breach and the legal outcome of any 
claim of breach”). 
 273. ALVAREZ, supra note 264, at 627. 
 274. Keohane & Nye, supra note 190, at 12–16. 
 275. See ALVAREZ, supra note 264, at 391 (discussing that treaty negotiations derive 
legitimacy from their processes because of the expectation that the resultant treaty’s rules 
will be applicable to all States involved and noting that even nonparties may be per-
suaded to follow the codified norms). 
 276. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Ad-
ministrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1515–16 (2006) (discussing democratic legitima-
cy). See also Keohane & Nye, supra note 190, at 12–13 (noting that publics can easily 
judge whether to accept a product of international negotiations if their respective gov-
ernments have operated in a transparent manner consistent with the states’ political sys-
tems). States also consent to work within international organizations. However, when 
these organizations create rules, the process of consent is further removed from the 
people affected by these rules and a democratic deficit is sometimes claimed. Id. at 21. 
The rules that emanate from these organizations are seen as lacking input legitimacy. See 
Esty, supra note 276, at 1502–03 (stating that international organizations suffer from 
“serious legitimacy issues” because the decision-making process is so far removed from 
the public). 
 277. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 190, at 14. 
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form of input legitimacy stems from process.278 Rules may be considered 
legitimate because they are the product of good procedures (and are 
therefore more likely to be both effective and more representative).279 
Alternatively, legitimacy may be claimed by virtue of the fact that the 
rules are effective—they do what they are supposed to do.280 Assessing 
the effectiveness of rules is a form of output legitimacy.281 People perce-
ive the rules as legitimate because they are good rules; they work. Natu-
rally, this assessment requires an assumption about what is a good rule or 
what works.282 Ultimately, as Ian Hurd explains, legitimacy is a matter of 
perception.283 Something is legitimate because one party believes that it 
is legitimate. It is a subjective understanding that is based upon a 
claim.284 That claim—the claim to legitimacy—can be assessed objec-
tively using representation, process, or effectiveness.285 
Assessing the legitimacy of soft law poses some unique challenges. 
First, since it is typically not treaty law, the claim to legitimacy based 
upon consent is not available. Moreover, claims of representativeness 
may be difficult to sustain as well. While organizations representing 
States may generate soft law, these organizations may suffer from the 
democratic deficit charge.286 For example, state agencies comprise 
IOSCO, but as others have argued, the United States dominates the 
Technical Committee, which sets the fundamental standards.287 Input 
                                                                                                                       
 278. Esty, supra note 276, at 1521. 
 279. Id. at 1519–20 (discussing systemic legitimacy). 
 280. Robert O. Keohane, Decisiveness and Accountability as Part of a Principled Re-
sponse to Nonstate Threats, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 219, 219 (2006). See also Esty, su-
pra note 276, at 1517 (noting that results-based legitimacy primarily concerns good out-
comes). 
 281. Keohane & Nye, supra note 190, at 15–16 (discussing output legitimacy in terms 
of effectiveness). 
 282. Kelly, supra note 35, at 619. 
 283. HURD, AFTER ANARCHY, supra note 66, at 7. See also Ian Hurd, Legitimacy, Pow-
er and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council, 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 35, 38 
(2002). 
 284. HURD, AFTER ANARCHY, supra note 66, at 7. 
 285. Kelly, supra note 35, at 608 (identifying input and output criteria for assessing 
legitimacy). 
 286. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. See also ALVAREZ, supra note 264, at 
630–31 (stating that rules and standards promulgated by international organizations “lack 
the legitimation of national law produced through democratic processes”). 
 287. The Technical Committee is currently comprised of fifteen member organiza-
tions, two of which—the SEC and the CFTC—are U.S. organizations. IOSCO Commit-
tee Lists, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=3 (last visited Feb. 
5, 2009). Cf. Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of 
Capital Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589, 594–95 (2001) (discussing the dominance 
of the United States and the United Kingdom in international equity markets and high-
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legitimacy in the form of process can likewise be problematic because 
soft law often gels behind closed doors or in a club organization.288 Some 
organizations have responded to this concern. IOSCO has procedures to 
promote transparency and public participation.289 Nevertheless, the Ex-
ecutive and Technical Committee Meetings are still closed to the pub-
lic.290 
The claim to effectiveness as a basis of output legitimacy seems most 
appealing, but it is difficult to assess. First, one must assume that the 
“good” outcome is in fact a good outcome.291 A second concern is that 
effectiveness for one set of participants may not be the same for another. 
                                                                                                                       
lighting that regulatory standards promulgated to ensure “best practices” generally stem 
from the practices of one or both of these countries). See also Bradley, supra note 99, at 
137 (noting that IOSCO tends “to be dominated by members from northern, economical-
ly developed States”). 
 288. Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale 
of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 131 (2005) (describing 
club organizations as secretive and stating that their industry-specific rules nonetheless 
tend to mature into law); Zaring, supra note 79, at 562 & n.64 (noting that IOSCO has 
been characterized as a club organization). 
 289. Zaring, supra note 79, at 563–65 (describing IOSCO’s efforts to comply with 
requests for information, to provide information to the public through its website, to al-
low SROs to contribute to the rulemaking process, and to maintain comment periods). 
For example, the Technical Committee’s report of its work program was made public in 
2007 for the purpose of soliciting comments and suggestions from stakeholders. IOSCO, 
An Overview of the Work of the IOSCO Technical Committee, at 2–4 (July 2008), availa-
ble at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD278.pdf. In response, IOSCO 
received comments from seventeen different organizations. IOSCO, Comments Received 
in Relation to the Consultation Report on “An Overview of the Work of the IOSCO Tech-
nical Committee,” at 2 (June 2007), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/ 
pdf/IOSCOPD251.pdf. 
 290. See Conference Programme—IOSCO 2008, http://www.iosco2008.org/spip.php? 
rubrique26 (last visited Feb. 5, 2009) (detailing the schedule for IOSCO’s 2008 Confe-
rence and dividing sessions according to those open only to IOSCO members and those 
open to the general public). Likewise, IASB is an expert-driven standard-setting organi-
zation. About the IASB, supra note 85. Amid criticisms that its standards were not fully 
legitimate because of its dependence on private funding, the organization “focused on 
increasing the transparency of its standards-making processes.” Bradley, supra note 99, at 
177–78. Following public consultations in 2004 and 2005, IASB issued a “Due Process 
Handbook,” which describes in detail its procedures for standard setting, transparency, 
and accountability. IASB, DUE PROCESS HANDBOOK, supra note 95, ¶¶ 4–17. Nonethe-
less, the organization remains “an independent group of experts.”  Id. ¶ 5. 
 291. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Chal-
lenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 620 (1999) (discuss-
ing outcome-based legitimacy in terms of expertise and noting that by preferring that 
experts formulate rules and standards in a given area, the public relies on the assumption 
that “expert” value and policy judgments will in fact produce the “best” results). 
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Whether the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention ultimately works well 
might be a different question for Canada than for Nigeria. A large, weal-
thy country may find some rules effective, while a weaker country might 
not. Third, effectiveness can be disputed, and it sometimes takes a great 
deal of time to determine whether a standard is effective.292 Some gaps 
only appear over time. The NRSROs were effective for years before the 
recent crisis.293 
Soft law securities regulation thus raises some legitimacy problems. 
The basis of its legitimacy seems most solidly rooted in its claim to ef-
fectiveness, a claim that is sometimes hard to substantiate. Still, it seems 
worthwhile to consider ways in which the legitimacy of soft law securi-
ties regulation can be improved from an input perspective. Good proce-
dures are helpful to promote debate and develop better rules.294 However, 
procedures can impede progress and increase costs.295 Similarly, input 
legitimacy claims would benefit from greater transparency and participa-
tion by those affected by the resulting rules, even if national regulators 
will exercise a fair degree of discretion implementing those rules. But 
again, participation slows things down and one would need to consider 
the possibility of capture and distortion in the rulemaking process.296 
B. Constitutional Queries 
International soft law securities regulation poses some constitutional 
queries, which are in large part academic, but nonetheless prompt ques-
tions concerning procedure, accountability, and transparency. First, in the 
United States, international agreements are constitutionally enacted as 
Article II treaties, congressional-executive agreements, or executive 
                                                                                                                       
 292. Kelly, supra note 35, at 621–22 (discussing the shortcomings of effectiveness as a 
determinant of legitimacy). 
 293. See Unterman, supra note 69, at 122–25 (stating that the recent “monumental 
failings are indicative of the poor health of the ratings industry” and that conflicts of in-
terest within the industry further emerge as the rating agencies extend their services with-
out regulation). 
 294. Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from 
Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 26–29 (2006) (discussing how mechanisms for participation 
encourage debate and allow for greater accountability). 
 295. Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative 
Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 81 (2005) (noting that when taken to extremes, 
procedure can thwart confidentiality and hinder both the formation and implementation 
of agreements). 
 296. Id. at 87 (noting the limitations on extensive participation in the international 
regulatory realm). 
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agreements.297 Each of these methods has a constitutional foundation that 
reflects the role of the executive and legislative branches.298 The regula-
tion of securities through the development of international soft law argu-
ably operates outside of this framework. Second, we are somewhat con-
cerned about what seems to be the delegation of standard-setting power 
to international bodies where those standards are then codified into U.S. 
law. We do not suggest that these arguments be given much merit, as we 
think it is largely a theoretical exercise, and we believe that international 
soft law securities regulations, on balance, are a good thing.299 Moreover, 
we feel that these delegations may be necessary in order to achieve regu-
latory cooperation and that they are not inconsistent with the level of del-
egations currently permitted under U.S. constitutional analysis. Never-
theless, reflecting upon these theoretical constitutional concerns prompts 
us to consider the principles underlying our constitutional structures, i.e., 
procedures for checks and balances, transparency, and accountability,300 
and how those principles should be applied to international soft law de-
velopment. 
In the United States, treaties are “agreement[s] between two or more 
states or international organizations that [are] intended to be legally bind-
ing and [are] governed by international law”301 and may be negotiated in 
                                                                                                                       
 297. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 
& cmt. a (1987). Comment a also includes executive agreements for which the president 
derives authority from a treaty. 
 298. The text of the Constitution grants the president the authority to enter into treaties 
on behalf of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Although Article II confers 
authority on the Senate to approve treaties, Article I grants both Houses the ability to 
regulate foreign commerce; thus, Congress is within its powers in authorizing the presi-
dent to negotiate and conclude congressional-executive agreements. E.g., Made in the 
U.S.A. Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (referencing this 
power with specific regards to the North American Free Trade Agreement). Similarly, the 
Constitution does not grant specific authority to the president to enter into executive 
agreements. The power to do so, however, is traditionally found in “the presidential re-
sponsibility of representing the country in foreign affairs, the authority to receive ambas-
sadors, the role of the commander-in-chief of the military, and the obligation to ‘take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.’” Robert J. Spitzer, The President, Congress, and the 
Fulcrum of Foreign Policy, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 95 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996). 
 299. See supra Part II.B. 
 300. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 72–73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (stating that checks and balances and electoral representation are powerful prin-
ciples by which republican government is enhanced); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James 
Madison), id. at 81–83 (noting that finding the optimal ratio of elected representatives to 
constituents is essential to ensuring that public interest is accurately represented). 
 301. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
301(1) (1987). 
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a variety of constitutionally acceptable ways. First, Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution provides that the President shall have the power to negotiate 
treaties with the “advice and consent” of the Senate.302 While this treaty 
power may be well-known, it is certainly not the most frequently exer-
cised.303 Rather, most international agreements are not really treaties as 
contemplated by Article II of the U.S. Constitution; they are executive 
agreements or congressional-executive agreements.304 These are interna-
tional agreements where the President acts pursuant to either his inherent 
or statutory powers.305 International soft law, however, evolves, and 
sometimes hardens, outside of these frameworks. 
                                                                                                                       
 302. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur.”). 
 303. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Con-
trol over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 636–37 
(1991) (discussing the rise to prominence of executive and congressional-executive 
agreements over treaties). 
 304. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1231 (1995). See 
also Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. 
L. REV. 961, 1002 (2001) (referencing the predominant use of congressional-executive 
agreements for international trade purposes). 
 305. Jeff Nemerofsky, Litvinov Lives?: U.S. Investors May Be Playing Russian Rou-
lette, 8 MICH. ST. U.-DCL J. INT’L L. 487, 492–93 (1999). The president may enter into 
executive agreements pursuant to his or her independent constitutional powers. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303(4) & 
cmt. a. Because they do not require independent approval, executive agreements are 
quicker and easier to conclude. Congressional-executive agreements, however, are treaty-
like in both substance and magnitude and are thus preferred, if not required, over execu-
tive agreements in cases concerning “material long-term agreements.” MICHAEL D. 
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 197–98 (2007). In congression-
al-executive agreements, the president has been pre-approved by Congress to commit the 
United States to subsequently enact legislation. John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sove-
reignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round 
Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 157, 168 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson, Sovereignty 
Debate]. Thus, for example, both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization are congressional-executive 
agreements. Spiro, supra note 304, at 962, 983 (noting the establishment of WTO specif-
ically, and the Uruguay Round generally). The process involved in these agreements is 
sometimes referred to as a “fast track” or “statutory” approval for what would otherwise 
be considered a treaty. Jackson, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 305, at 168 & n.21. Un-
derstandably, it would have been impossible for the United States to negotiate compli-
cated tariff and trade liberalization commitments with over 100 nations unless those na-
tions were assured that the agreement would not falter in the typical treaty ratification 
process under Article II. See John K. Setear, The President’s Rational Choice of a Trea-
ty’s Preratification Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Execu-
tive Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S5, S27 (2002) (discussing that for trade agreements 
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Initially, even though soft law develops outside of the treaty system, it 
does not seem troubling because it is not binding. The Case-Zabloki Act 
requires the Secretary of State to compile and publish “United States 
Treaties and Other International Agreements” for each year.306 The regu-
lations under the Act set forth the criteria for identifying treaties and in-
ternational agreements, namely that they (1) identify the parties as States, 
agencies, or IGOs, and their intent to be bound by international law;307 
(2) be of political or financial significance, or pertain to technical coop-
eration or assistance;308 (3) be specific and contain “objective criteria for 
determining enforceability”;309 and (4) must at least be bilateral.310 Soft 
law is not “treaty law” because it does not purport to bind either by intent 
or by its terms, nor does it contain explicit provisions for enforceabili-
ty.311 
Soft law sometimes hardens into binding treaty law. That hardening 
may occur, as in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, after soft law 
moves normative positions far enough that States are willing to make a 
hard law commitment in a form of agreement already recognized as con-
stitutionally acceptable. But other times, soft law hardens through regula-
tory codification. One recent example of regulatory codification involves 
CRAs. Since the collapse of Enron there has been increased focus on the 
appropriate regulations of CRAs.312 While national regulators have stu-
                                                                                                                       
the president usually chooses the congressional-executive route to “signal [that] reliable 
and rapid implementation is paramount”). See also id. at S6 (discussing various Article II 
treaties previously submitted to the Senate for approval, but which have “languish[ed] 
without definitive floor action”). Concerns that executive agreements and congressional-
executive agreements are outside constitutional bounds have been laid to rest by the Su-
preme Court. Generally speaking, the judiciary has upheld such agreements and has left 
the distinction of whether an agreement is a treaty within the meaning of Article II up to 
the legislative and executive branches as a political matter. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414–15 (2003). 
 306. 1 U.S.C. § 112a(a) (2006). 
 307. 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a)(1) (2008). It is noteworthy that unless otherwise specified, 
such agreements are presumed to be governed by international law. However, if either 
U.S. or foreign law is specified as solely governing, the agreement is not considered “in-
ternational.” 
 308. Id. § 181.2(a)(2). “Minor or trivial undertakings, even if couched in legal lan-
guage and form, are not considered international agreements.” Id. 
 309. Id. § 181.2(a)(3). Yet again, however, vagueness of terms will not of itself prec-
lude an agreement from being a legally binding international agreement. The most impor-
tant determination will be that of the parties’ intent. 
 310. Id. § 181.2(a)(4). 
 311. See supra note 263 (defining soft law as nonbinding); and supra note 52 (noting 
that soft law can be contained in treaty law). 
 312. Hill, supra note 225, at 43–44 (stating that “the impetus for regulatory change 
[was] the Enron debacle”). See also Unterman, supra note 69, at 108–09 (noting the need 
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died the problem, so have international bodies such as IOSCO and the 
Financial Stability Forum. IOSCO’s Consultation Report of 2008 and 
new Code of Professional Conduct represent soft law.313 However, the 
SEC’s current regulatory initiatives for CRAs that incorporate some 
IOSCO and Financial Stability Forum input are solidifying international 
soft law into hard law. Another example concerns IFRS. The SEC cur-
rently has out for comment proposed rules and a roadmap that would 
require U.S. companies to state their financials in accordance with IFRS, 
again transforming international soft law into domestic hard law. Also, 
the SEC amended its foreign issuer disclosure forms to replace the non-
financial disclosure forms with ones substantively endorsed by 
IOSCO.314 
Where soft law hardens via regulatory action, the practical effect 
seems indistinguishable from hard law codified after the conclusion of a 
treaty. In the United States, agency regulations, if enacted pursuant to 
delegated authority and not arbitrary and capricious, are the law,315 just 
as a statute implementing a treaty is the law. In the case where the SEC 
uses substantive norms developed by IOSCO, assuming that the SEC 
acted within its regulatory mandate (and pursuant to proper procedure), 
the only remaining question would be whether the substantive standard 
was arbitrary and capricious.316 One could envision a situation where the 
SEC’s case for nonarbitrariness was bolstered by the fact that the stan-
dard had been developed by an international organization.317 The result is 
hard law. 
Admittedly, one can argue that soft law is of no constitutional concern 
until a constitutionally acceptable codification occurs. Thus, for example, 
despite the soft law evolution of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the 
                                                                                                                       
for additional resources to oversee the international market in light of the SEC’s inability 
to both discover and prevent abuses in the U.S. domestic market, including the 
WorldCom and Enron collapses). 
 313. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 314. International Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release No. 7745, 64 Fed. Reg. 
53,900, 53,903 (Oct. 5, 1999) (stating that the SEC amended Form 20-F to include “ten 
new items that track the wording of the IOSCO disclosure standards”). 
 315. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984) (stating that where Congress had delegated authority to an agency to fill gaps in 
legislation, that agency’s “regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbi-
trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”) (citations omitted). 
 316. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–
45 (1983) (accepting petitioner’s construction of the arbitrary and capricious standard and 
agreeing that if an agency is within its mandate, the Court may not set the agency’s rules 
and standards aside unless they are not rationally linked to relevant data). 
 317. Bradley, supra note 99, at 138 (noting that international standards may receive the 
benefit of the doubt when domestic regulators consider implementing them). 
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final binding instrument was an Article II treaty that was signed by the 
President and ratified by the Senate.318 Up to that point, the negotiations 
at the OECD did not have any constitutional significance. Even codifica-
tion through the regulatory process seems unobjectionable as long as the 
agency has the authority to enact the regulations and the choice of the 
internationally set standard is not arbitrary and capricious. 
But sometimes soft law operates like hard law prior to any codifica-
tion. For example, as discussed above, MOUs are not legally binding 
instruments.319 They are negotiated between the SEC and foreign regula-
tors.320 Despite their nonbinding status, however, these agreements are 
followed.321 As previously noted, in 2007, the SEC made 556 requests to 
foreign regulators for assistance and information under MOUs and re-
sponded to 454 requests.322 Likewise, in 2005, IOSCO required that all of 
its members sign or commit to signing its MMOU by 2010.323 This 
“nonbinding” agreement is now virtually mandatory. 
Theoretically, if MOUs were considered treaties, they would fail to sa-
tisfy our constitutional framework. They are negotiated and agreed to by 
an independent agency, the SEC.324 They cannot be characterized as ex-
ecutive agreements, as it would be very difficult to argue that the matters 
they concern fall under inherent presidential powers;325 nor are they con-
gressional-executive agreements.326 Assuming arguendo that one could 
view the SEC as negotiating on behalf of the executive, there is no ex 
ante congressional authorization to do so. Subsequent congressional au-
                                                                                                                       
 318. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (1998), reprinted in 
Hein’s No. KAV 5210. 
 319. JOHNSTON, supra note 154, at 37 (discussing that MOUs are accorded “less-than-
treaty status” because of their informality and nonbinding form). 
 320. STEINBERG, supra note 155, at 205. 
 321. See supra notes 157–58, 164 and accompanying text (discussing SEC requests to 
foreign regulators under MOUs). 
 322. SEC Speaks in 2008, supra note 163, at 1201–02. 
 323. See Jane Diplock, AO, Chairman, Executive Comm. of IOSCO & Sec. Comm’n, 
N.Z., Speech—ASIC Summer School: Is Regulation Keeping up with or Fettering Cross-
Border Developments (Feb. 17, 2006), available at http://www.seccom.govt.nz/speeches/ 
2006/jds170206.shtml. 
 324. See text accompanying supra notes 154–56, 158 (discussing the first MOU signed 
by the SEC and Switzerland in 1982, and the Office of International Affairs). 
 325. See supra note 302 (discussing the derivation of authority by the executive to 
enter into international agreements). 
 326. See supra note 298, 304–05 and accompanying text (citing the ability of Congress 
to delegate its powers to the executive for the purposes of concluding international 
agreements). 
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thorization that speaks to only one class of MOUs327 does not validate the 
process in all instances. 
Nevertheless, we believe that these instruments are not binding and a 
treaty powers analysis does not foreclose international soft law securities 
regulation. It may be formalistic to say that these agreements are not 
binding until they are binding, but given the myriad of ways in which 
soft law forms and hardens over time, a line must be drawn at some 
point. That point, in our view, should be where States formally commit 
to bind themselves, even if in practice States may routinely comply with 
obligations prior to such time. 
A more challenging constitutional concern, in our view, is the nonde-
legation question. The nondelegation doctrine prevents the abdication of 
lawmaking power by Congress.328 Congress must give an agency an in-
telligible principle in order to fulfill its legislative mandate.329 The SEC’s 
negotiation of MOUs seems dangerously close to agency lawmaking 
without an intelligible principle and without sufficient safeguards.330 
                                                                                                                       
 327. In 1989, Congress amended the Exchange Act by adding § 21(a)(2), which gave 
the SEC the authority to cooperate with requests for information from foreign regulators 
and allowed the SEC discretion in deciding whether to supply the information. The SEC 
is to consider two factors when deciding to provide assistance: reciprocity and the U.S. 
public interest. Specifically, the first consideration is “whether . . . the requesting authori-
ty has agreed to provide reciprocal assistance.” Insider Trading and Securities Fraud En-
forcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, sec. 6(b), § 21(a), 102 Stat. 4677, 4681–82 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(a)(2) (2008)). Then in 1990, Congress 
amended the Exchange Act again to include a section stating that the SEC “shall not be 
compelled to disclose records obtained from a foreign securities authority if . . . the 
Commission obtains such records pursuant to . . . a memorandum of understanding.” 
International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550, sec. 
201–02, § 24(d), 104 Stat. 2713, 2714–15 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78x(d) 
(2008)). These amendments, however, merely recognized the SEC’s information-sharing 
MOUs—they did not grant the agency further authority to conclude future MOUs. 
 328. Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000) (stating 
that traditionally the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine was “to ensure that law is 
made by the national legislature rather than by the executive”). 
 329. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (stating that 
since the Constitution vests lawmaking powers in Congress, the delegation of congres-
sional authority must be specific and provide an “intelligible principle” (quoting J. W. 
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). See also Sunstein, su-
pra note 328, at 318 (identifying the “intelligible principle” requirement). 
 330. While the SEC’s mandate is “to enforce . . . securities laws, to promote stability 
in the markets and, most importantly, to protect investors,” Congress did not specifically 
authorize the SEC to enter into information-sharing MOUs with foreign regulators. The 
Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2009) (noting the purpose behind the SEC’s formation). See also supra note 
161–62 and accompanying text (discussing congressional amendments to the Exchange 
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While the nondelegation doctrine gives us pause, ultimately we feel that 
the practical benefits of international soft law instruments weigh in favor 
of a generous view of delegation, consistent with that of the Supreme 
Court with respect to domestic lawmaking.331 
The constitutional status of MOUs and other international soft law in-
struments that may harden at some later date is (and in our opinion 
should remain) a theoretical question. These soft law instruments are ex-
pedient, flexible, and very useful. The time and burdens of negotiating 
either an Article II treaty or a congressional-executive agreement would 
impede effective and timely standard setting.332 The delegation question, 
although somewhat troubling, occurs in the domestic setting as well. But 
the constitutional inquiry should cause us to at least consider the values 
that support our constitutional system: procedures for checks and bal-
ances, accountability, and transparency. While soft law may escape con-
stitutional objections, it should be supported by the foundational values 
akin to those underlying our constitutional system, i.e., division of pow-
ers, accountability, and transparency.333 
The division of powers provides checks and balances against the abuse 
of power.334 The process by which the United States enters into binding 
                                                                                                                       
Act that recognize, but do not specifically authorize, the SEC’s MOUs). Nonetheless, the 
SEC claims the authority to enter into such agreements based on its duty to enforce secur-
ities laws because MOUs are mechanisms that facilitate “enforcement-related informa-
tion sharing.” Office of International Affairs: International Enforcement Cooperation, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_crossborder.htm#mechanisms (last visited Feb. 
14, 2009). 
 331. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472. 
 332. See supra notes 301, 305, 307–10 and accompanying text (discussing the 
processes of concluding Article II treaties and congressional-executive agreements). 
 333. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 300, at 72–73 (dis-
cussing that although they were “wholly new discoveries” at the time, republican prin-
ciples of power distribution, checks and balances, and representation would help to per-
fect the Framers’ choice of government); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), id. at 
81–83 (noting that the proper ratio of representatives to constituents results in greater 
accountability and transparency). 
 334. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), id. at 301 (responding to charges 
that the Constitution violated the “political maxim” that the three governmental branches 
must be entirely “separate and distinct”). Madison discussed the necessity of the separa-
tion of powers amongst governmental branches, but noted that the branches must be 
somewhat intermingled if they are to prevent the usurpation and abuse of power. Id. at 
302–04 (citing the New Hampshire constitution in declaring that the branches should be 
entirely independent of each other only to the extent that it “is consistent with the chain 
of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of 
unity and amity”). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), id. at 308 (discuss-
ing that this “blending” of the branches affords each a check on the other two, and thus 
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international agreements envisions a role for both the legislative and the 
executive branches (save for those issues solely within the executive’s 
power).335 Some soft law instruments, such as MOUs or IASB account-
ing standards, may endanger this balance. When soft law hardens into 
international obligations, it would seem fair to question whether the 
manner in which it evolved had sufficient protections against the abuse 
of power. 
The lack of input from both the executive and legislative branches 
raises problems of accountability. Where internationally set standards 
fall short or fail, a question arises as to who can be held accountable.336 
Arguably, if the IASB standards or MOUs fail, then blame can lay with 
the SEC the same way it would if any standard or rule set by the SEC 
failed. However, the SEC may not be called to task for such failures; 
blame may be levied at the international system instead.337 There may be 
a backlash against international cooperation, and that backlash may occur 
in multiple jurisdictions.338 Additionally, the SEC could seek greater au-
                                                                                                                       
maintains the maxim of free government in a way that complete separation could never 
achieve). 
 335. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting power to the president to make treaties 
with the Senate’s advice and consent); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 (1987) (listing four ways by which the United States 
may enter into binding international agreements, the first three of which require Senate or 
congressional approval on some level, and the final being pursuant to the executive’s sole 
authority). 
 336. See Chris Kentouris, Harmonizing Accounting Standards No Easy Task—
Uniformity Could Promote Cross-Border Investment, But When?, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, 
June 30, 2008 (discussing support for an overseeing body to monitor the IASB and facili-
tate cooperation among regulators and standard setters); Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Says For-
eign Companies Do Not Have to Adjust to U.S. Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, 
at C8 (discussing concerns that there is no international equivalent of the SEC to ensure 
consistent enforcement of international standards and also noting that European officials 
are skeptical of the IASB because it is not currently politically accountable). Cf. David 
Reilly & Kara Scannell, Global Accounting Efforts Gain a Step—SEC Drops Require-
ment on Foreign Companies, but Other Challenges Loom, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2007, at 
A4 (noting that the IASB could be “buffered from political interference”). 
 337. See, e.g., Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International Financial 
Regulation: Increasing Reliance on a Public-Private Partnership, 37 INT’L LAW. 43, 59 
(2003) (stating that in a globalized financial regulatory scheme, the onus is ultimately on 
the private international institutions to oversee implementation and enforcement of rules 
and standards and that failures by these institutions can lead to industry crises). Cf. Ra-
chel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 
537–38 (2004) (discussing motivations for international agreements generally, but noting 
that by delegating rulemaking authority to an international body, the executive “can shift 
much of the blame for unpopular policies”). 
 338. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Accounting Plan Would Allow Use of Foreign Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2008, at A1 (mistaking the SEC’s proposal to allow U.S. companies 
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thority from Congress, claiming that the failure stemmed from the lack of 
authority to regulate as it would like.339 
Perhaps the most difficult problem is the lack of transparency that is 
endemic to international standard setting. The development of internation-
al soft law and its hardening are particularly susceptible to nontranspa-
rency.340 Experts that develop standards, rules, or guidelines that become 
soft law sometimes do so without the participation or even knowledge of 
the wider public.341 The OECD is a club organization that has a limited 
number of members from the wealthiest nations.342 Yet its anti-bribery 
work targeted activities that occurred throughout the developing world. 
IOSCO is a club of securities regulators.343 But it is dominated by Amer-
                                                                                                                       
to shift to international accounting standards and to promote international enforcement 
cooperation as part of a deregulation agenda meant to soften the stricter securities laws in 
place following the Enron collapse, primarily because the international standards are 
“weaker” than those of the United States). But see Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Push for New 
Accounting Standards Gains Speed, WASH. POST, July 8, 2008, at D01 (noting that by 
allowing U.S. companies to use international accounting standards, it would “ease global 
business dealings and help corporations raise capital around the world,” but discussing 
that critics see the move as a means to weaken post-Enron rules). 
 339. In its 2003 report on CRAs, the SEC discussed a number of problems inherent to 
the industry and indicated that participants in the CRA hearings had suggested that the 
SEC “consider more substantive regulation of rating agencies . . . and engage in more 
active ongoing oversight of them.” SARBANES-OXLEY REPORT, supra note 231, at 25. The 
report concluded by stating that the SEC would investigate whether ongoing oversight 
was necessary and if so, would subsequently ask Congress for the legislative authority to 
monitor the rating agencies. Id. at 45. Responding to the SEC report and calls for CRA 
oversight, Congress passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act in 2006, and the SEC 
promulgated implementing rules in 2007. See supra notes 247 and accompanying text. 
See also Roberta Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas: The Securities 
and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
79, 80–81 (2005) (discussing that the SEC exploited corporate failures to entice Congress 
to grant the agency regulatory power over corporate governance, which it finally did with 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
 340. Brewster, supra note 337, at 539 (noting that international rulemaking occurs 
with less transparency than the domestic process). 
 341. E.g., Mattli & Buthe, supra note 86, at 254 (noting that because IASB is a private 
standard setter, it relies on technical expertise and suggestions from large accounting 
firms); supra notes 289–90 (discussing that even with IOSCO’s increased availability of 
information, the organization still does not provide a mechanism whereby the public can 
actively participate in rulemaking). See also Brewster, supra note 337, at 539 (discussing 
the inaccessibility of international organizations to the general public and noting that the 
compromises achieved in these rulemaking fora are usually only possible because of 
“[t]he promise that all deals will be kept behind closed doors”). 
 342. The OECD has been characterized as a “rich countries’ club” because of its li-
mited membership. SLAUGHTER, supra note 72, at 144; Avi-Yonah, supra note 190, at 32. 
 343. Zaring, supra note 79, at 562 & n.64. 
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ican regulators.344 Even when soft law emerges from the international 
agreement process that surrounds MOUs, it can be the result of compro-
mise that is hidden from the public view.345 In fact, MOUs are often used 
because of the parties’ concerns regarding confidentiality.346 Sometimes, 
private actors who are unaccustomed to acting in the public view are in-
volved. The FASB and the IASB standards are established by an indus-
try, not a legislator or regulator. The rating agencies established criteria 
that were, in effect, adopted by the SEC by virtue of its recognition of 
NRSROs.347 Private actors are not necessarily accustomed to acting in a 
transparent manner and may need to adopt specific procedures to become 
transparent.348 Admittedly, private actors influence the national legisla-
tive process as well. Legislation evolves through the efforts of private 
parties, industry, or even regulators who lobby the legislative branch to 
adopt laws.349 
International soft law is also less transparent because it usually takes 
the form of standards rather than rules. International standards usually 
                                                                                                                       
 344. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
 345. Chinkin, Challenge of Soft Law, supra note 272, at 861 (stating that “[t]he use of 
a soft law form is often a compromise”); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in Interna-
tional Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 597 (2005) (discussing soft law agreements as 
“pacts” and noting that they are more confidential than other international agreements 
and that use of them “lessens the likelihood that Congress—and domestic interest 
groups—will be aware of an agreement or able to capitalize politically on criticism of 
it”). 
 346. JOHNSTON, supra note 154, at 37–38 (noting the desirability of MOUs where con-
fidentiality is a concern). MOUs are ideal for this purpose because so few are published. 
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 43 (2007). Additionally, in the 
United States, all binding international agreements must be reported to Congress, regard-
less of their secretive subject matter. Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C.A. § 112b(a) (2008). 
But if MOUs are carefully constructed so as not to create binding rights and obligations, 
they do not have to be reported to Congress or the State Department. See 22 C.F.R. § 
181.2(a) (1981) (stating that all criteria must be met for a document to be construed as an 
international agreement within the purview of the Case-Zablocki Act). 
 347. SARBANES-OXLEY REPORT, supra note 231, at 6–9 (describing the function and 
recognition process for NRSROs). 
 348. Mattli & Buthe, supra note 86, at 261 (discussing that while private bodies are 
advantageous to international regulation, they provide less transparency and accountabili-
ty than public regulatory bodies). See also id. at 258 (noting that following the Enron 
collapse, institutions including the IASB were pressured to adopt more transparent proce-
dures and provide greater public access to their rulemaking processes); IASB, DUE 
PROCESS HANDBOOK, supra note 95 (detailing IASB’s new due process standards in re-
sponse to criticisms concerning accountability and transparency). 
 349. International standard setting may involve foreign parties or regulators whose 
presence may raise additional sovereignty concerns. However, international regulatory 
cooperation will necessarily involve some diminution of sovereignty. 
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grant a fair amount of discretion to national regulators. Discretion is, by 
definition, nontransparent. In IOSCO, national regulators develop stan-
dards that grant those same national regulators a great deal of discretion 
in implementation.350 The fact that discretion is endorsed by an interna-
tional organization (made up of those same regulators) seems troubling. 
A lack of transparency is particularly worrisome because transparency 
guards against two problems that are of particular concern international-
ly: capture and conflicts of interest.351 Both capture and conflicts of in-
terests are problems in the domestic arena, however, as regulatory coop-
eration proliferates, the incentives for capture, the danger of conflicts, 
and the harm that can come from either are magnified.352 The incentives 
for capture and conflicts are not increased in the international sphere, but 
the dangers posed by them are magnified in this globalized world. The 
systemic and global effects of a regulatory failure are palpable. The re-
cent credit rating crisis serves as an example.353 Moreover, the collateral 
damage from securities law failures now reaches the public even if it did 
not before. Pensioners, municipalities, and entities that invest in the mar-
ket, from universities to charitable funds, all rely upon a well-functioning 
securities system.354 Thus, although the international soft law deficien-
cies may mirror those found domestically, their potential impact seems 
greater, and care should be taken to address them. 
C. Regulatory Competition v. Regulatory Cooperation 
Soft law may offer an alternative to regulatory competition by facilitat-
ing regulatory cooperation. The absence of a single international securi-
ties law regulator creates the potential for a classic regulatory race to the 
                                                                                                                       
 350. IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, supra note 73, at 3 
(stating that IOSCO members are to “use their best endeavors within their jurisdiction to 
ensure adherence to [the] principles” and noting that however each regulator implements 
the principles, they should take “the entire domestic context” into account). 
 351. Stewart, supra note 295, at 83 (stating that transparency allows the public to see 
the facts underlying decision making, which opens the process to scrutiny and can “alle-
viate information asymmetries, and check the influence of narrow interest groups”). 
 352. See supra notes 294–96. 
 353. Unterman, supra note 69, at 122–24 (discussing the failures and conflicts of inter-
est of the rating agencies and noting that these failures resonate globally because of the 
tremendous power CRAs have in both domestic and international markets). 
 354. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Jr., Opinion, Standards Deviation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 
2007, at A15, ¶ 1 (stating that “[t]he potential for crisis in municipal finance arguably is 
worse than that in corporate America”); Reilly & Scannell, supra note 336, at A4 (noting 
that large institutional investors such as Calpers are concerned about the possibility of 
international accounting standards because inconsistent application of such standards 
would affect the credibility of financial disclosures). 
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bottom. Race to the bottom theorists assume that regulatory competition 
and the lack of a single mandatory framework will encourage managers 
to incorporate in jurisdictions that have the least demanding regulatory 
structure.355 Others propose that regulatory competition can be benefi-
cial.356 The authors believe that without the leadership of an economic 
hegemon to insist upon some fundamental minimum standards, it is like-
ly that international securities regulation will remain weak and reactive. 
The availability of multiple regulatory jurisdictions leads to harmful 
regulatory competition. Without binding standards, States are free to 
adopt whatever standards they feel are best. States wishing to make 
themselves more attractive business centers will opt for standards that are 
more favorable to those businesses.357 
Others disagree. Race to the top theorists contend that regulatory com-
petition will promote efficiency and that efficiency ultimately benefits 
investors.358 A variety of regulatory frameworks provides managers with 
options to respond to investor preferences.359 As preferences are revealed 
and management responds in order to produce efficiencies, jurisdictions 
will then realign their laws.360 Thus, a level of harmonization will 
emerge, but not as a result of a paternalistic single regulator.361 Race to 
                                                                                                                       
 355. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and Regulatory 
Competition, 57 BUS. LAW. 1047, 1047 (2002) (discussing state competition in takeover 
law in particular and noting that this competition tends to favor and even entrench man-
agement while harming shareholder interests). 
 356. E.g., Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition in Securities Law: A Dream 
(That Should Be) Deferred, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2005) (discussing the race to the 
top and efficiency); Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 262, at 393–96 (discuss-
ing that competition aids management in choosing the jurisdiction with optimal regula-
tions and can compensate for policy differences). 
 357. Shelley Thompson, The Globalization of Securities Markets: Effects on Investor 
Protection, 41 INT’L LAW. 1121, 1123 (2007) (“Permitting companies to list on global 
exchanges, while simultaneously allowing them to choose the most favorable and least 
onerous national regulatory scheme, will result in global competition among regulators. 
And where the very purpose of regulation is to protect the public where competition does 
not, competition between regulators will likely lead to less protection for the public.”). 
 358. Prentice, supra note 356, at 1156 (noting that race to the top proponents argue 
that state competition creates maximally efficient corporate law). 
 359. Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 262, at 393–96 (discussing that com-
petition tends to reveal investors’ preferences and allows for different jurisdictions to 
both find the “optimal mix” of management and shareholder benefits). 
 360. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regu-
lation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2385, 2394 [hereinafter Romano, Empowering Investors] 
(stating that if investors prefer the mandatory disclosure rules promulgated by the SEC, 
then those same rules would still emerge as a result of “competitive federalism”). 
 361. Id. at 2378–79 (discussing the SEC’s hesitance to allow projections because of its 
fear that investors would not know the difference between a forecast and hard financial 
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the top supporters have extended this analysis to the international regula-
tion of securities.362 They view efficiency as the ultimate goal and have 
faith in investors to push management to maximize efficiency.363 
On balance, we would agree with the race to the bottom view, especial-
ly in the international realm. We believe the regulatory vacuum is more 
pronounced internationally because other differences among States and 
their populations make consensus unlikely. Nations approach securities 
regulation from different cultural perspectives, from different economic 
standpoints, and with different governmental structures and resources. In 
a national race to the bottom, where there may be several jurisdictions 
under a federal umbrella, some of these differences are less severe. 
For example, the United States and the European countries have differ-
ent views of the role of government versus the market as a regulator. As 
seen in the recent debate over credit rating agencies, the United States 
prefers preserving the role of market forces, while the European Union 
leans towards a greater government role or substantive regulation of the 
ratings process.364 Standards may also differ because of governmental 
roles or structures. The Chinese government has a majority interest in 
most public companies.365 Public accountants are unlikely to find serious 
                                                                                                                       
data); id. at 2368–69 (stating that market conditions may once have necessitated manda-
tory antifraud rules, but that it is “silly” to assume that investors are incapable of distin-
guishing regulatory regimes that encourage fraud from those that protect against it). 
 362. Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 815, 820–24 (2001) (discussing “portable reciprocity”); Romano, Need for Com-
petition, supra note 262, at 388. Romano also suggests that all restrictions on issuer 
choice must be removed for a “truly competitive international securities regulation re-
gime” to be successful. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE 
FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 148–49 (2002). 
 363. Winter, supra note 262, at 883. See also id. at 901–02 (stating that “[l]osses are 
an inevitable aspect of competitive markets” and further regulation will not rid the market 
of losses, it will only make the market less efficient); Romano, Empowering Investors, 
supra note 360, at 2366; Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 262, at 389–90 (both 
noting that institutional investors drive the U.S. market and that their sophistication will 
offset less sophisticated investors). 
 364. See supra notes 236–38 and accompanying text (discussing that government regu-
lation of CRAs in the United States is controversial). See also Barber, supra note 256, at 
3 (discussing the inadequacy of the European Union’s self-regulatory framework and the 
legislative push for CESR to oversee CRA registrations, but also noting the fear that 
stricter regulation in the European Union than in the United States would result in incon-
sistent regulation); Unterman, supra note 69, at 124–25 (discussing that in the wake of 
recent failures within the CRA industry, Congress has responded not by reducing the 
market power exerted by CRAs, but rather by encouraging competition and requiring 
greater transparency and accountability). 
 365. Chi-Wei Huang, Worldwide Corporate Convergence Within a Pluralistic Busi-
ness Legal Order: Company Law and the Independent Director System in Contemporary 
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fault with the accounting statements of a government-owned entity. Also, 
there is more incentive for the international race to the bottom. National 
jurisdictions see a big payoff in becoming the regulatory forum of 
choice.366 That payoff in the international realm is global.367 
It is also very difficult to exert sufficient leverage internationally in or-
der to impose high standards. For example, even though the United 
States was able to overcome some cultural and normative differences 
surrounding the Swiss bank secrecy laws and views on insider trading,368 
it cannot impose its norms concerning obtaining evidence of fraud 
worldwide. There are other jurisdictions that are willing to replicate the 
Swiss laws and remain oblivious to U.S. concerns.369 
                                                                                                                       
China, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 361, 387 (discussing the “concentrated own-
ership regime” in Chinese corporations and noting that the problem of minority share-
holder exploitation is exacerbated in China because so often the government is the con-
trolling shareholder). 
 366. For example, those arguing that state competition in corporate law is a race to the 
bottom note that competition is driven by States’ desires to maximize tax revenue from 
businesses incorporating within their borders, but that this competition leads to proble-
matic deregulation in favor of management. Cary, supra note 262, at 668–69 (“For reve-
nue reasons, ‘creating a favorable climate’ is declared to be the public policy of the 
state.”). See also Greenwood, supra note 262, at 385 (noting that the competition for 
corporate charters is one that produces more sources of tax revenue for the state of incor-
poration). 
 367. Different countries may compete for issuers by specializing in investor protec-
tions, for example. Others may cater to the interests of management. But once a country 
becomes a favorite regulatory regime, it can charge foreign issuers a higher fee for use of 
its regulatory and enforcement services, which may not otherwise be available in the 
issuer’s home country. Choi, supra note 362, at 820–23 (discussing that issuer choice 
would lead to competition among various countries for increased securities transactions 
within their borders because of the fees generated by those transactions and the benefits 
from a general increase in the regulating country’s market capital). 
 368. Macey, supra note 157, at 1367–68 (discussing that the SEC was able to negotiate 
an information-sharing MOU with Switzerland even though Swiss law traditionally did 
not criminalize insider trading). 
 369. For example, Dennis Levine was an investment banker for Lehman Brothers 
Kuhn Loeb, Inc., and received inside information from another Lehman employee regard-
ing the acquisition of Itek Corporation by Litton Industries, Inc. Litton Indus., Inc. v. 
Lehman Bros. Loeb Kuhn, Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 744 (2d Cir. 1992). In order to profit from 
this inside information, Levine made several purchases of Itek stock during the 1980s, 
but did so through a Bahamian bank. Id. at 745–46. Today, bank and tax secrecy are still 
prevalent in other countries, and the issue has even spurred support for the “Tax Haven 
Abuse Act,” now in the Senate. Europe, U.S. Battle Swiss Bank Secrecy, supra note 48. 
The bill identifies thirty-four “offshore secrecy jurisdictions,” including the Bahamas, the 
Cayman Islands, Lichtenstein, Panama, and Singapore. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 
681, 110th Cong. § 101(b)(50)(E), available at http://www/govtrack.us/congress/bill 
text.xpd?bill=s110-681 (last visited Jan. 25, 2009). 
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Stopping the race has traditionally required a leader that can insist 
upon some mandatory standards. Thus, supporters of increased market 
regulation feel that the SEC has successfully protected U.S. investors 
with mandatory disclosure rules, for example, and should continue to do 
so by imposing stricter regulations on management.370 The problem is 
that in the international realm, a single regulator does not exist, and no 
one State currently has the muscle to insist upon mandatory standards. 
Soft law offers regulatory cooperation as an alternative to competition. 
By using soft law, States can commit to standards developed by experts 
without necessarily binding themselves to an international obligation. As 
a result, States have time to allow normative preferences to shift domes-
tically before committing themselves to hard law. It also gives States a 
politically viable means of compromise. While the United States for 
years resisted any public departure from U.S. GAAP, soft law paved the 
way for IFRS. Despite the fact that soft law can evolve over time, it is 
more useful that hard law alternatives because its initial development 
occurs swiftly in response to changing conditions. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, we believe that globalization and integration of markets 
will leave States with two regulatory choices: competition or coopera-
tion. In our view regulatory competition will lead to a race to the bottom 
and the absence of meaningful standards. Stopping a race to the bottom 
requires a hegemon that can insist on its standards. Although the U.S. 
continues to be a “hub of the international economy” it lacks the power it 
once had.371 Thus, in order to have meaningful standards States must 
cooperate and compromise. Soft law makes cooperation and compromise 
possible. Soft law provides for flexibility and expertise, and can evolve 
without the political pressures that hinder cooperation among States. Soft 
law norms allow States to work towards convergence and harmonization 
without binding obligations. And soft law may ultimately harden once 
normative positions and rationalistic preferences have moved sufficiently 
                                                                                                                       
 370. See Cary, supra note 262, at 667–68 (noting that state competition in corporate 
governance law is the result of a “failure to recognize the difference between the goals of 
industrial capitalism and the abuses of finance capitalism”). Contra Romano, Empower-
ing Investors, supra note 360, at 2367–68 (stating that the need to prevent a market fail-
ure does not equate to the necessity of “a monopolist regulator”); Ralph K. Winter, Eco-
nomic Regulation vs. Competition: Ralph Nader and Creeping Capitalism, 82 YALE L.J. 
890, 891 (1973) (noting “theoretically defective” government justifications for regula-
tion). 
 371. See Daniel Dombey, Washington Is Forced to Watch Other Powers Shape Events, 
FIN. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2008, at 7. 
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to make a binding commitment politically acceptable. Or, soft law may 
remain soft, but still guide conduct in a stabilizing and helpful way. 
Thus, in our view international soft law securities regulation is a good 
product. 
But it is not without its problems. Soft law faces a legitimacy chal-
lenge. If soft law regulation is to take hold, those affected by it must 
perceive it as legitimate, either because it works or because they believe 
that the manner in which it evolved took account of their interests and 
input. Effectiveness is difficult to judge. It is not clear that there is one 
universal standard of “effective” securities regulation. And even if there 
were, a scandal or crisis can cast doubt upon regulatory effectiveness 
very quickly causing distrust, backlash, and overregulation. Input legiti-
macy claims are also problematic. Private organizations that develop soft 
law norms have not typically worried about transparency or participation 
for nonmembers. Procedures to strengthen soft law’s input credentials 
are already being adopted by bodies such as IOSCO and IASB, i.e., 
measures to increase participation and transparency. But more can be 
done. 
International soft law also faces problems similar to those faced in its 
domestic analog, that is, capture, accountability, the potential for abuses, 
and conflicts of interest. While these are the same problems faced na-
tionally in many jurisdictions, the global environment cautions for extra 
care to combat them. These problems, although of the same kind, are of a 
different degree simply because the stakes are bigger. The payoff for 
capture and abuse is greater. And the consequences are magnified as 
well. The systemic risks for failure are tremendous. More needs to be 
done about these concerns. We believe, though, that the systemic risks of 
rejecting soft law regulation are far greater. Without soft law regulation, 
we see little alternative to the race to the bottom and the absence of mea-
ningful standards. 
 
